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PERSPECTIVES
Economic and Trade Related Aspects of
Transborder Data Flow: Elements of a
Code for Transnational Commerce
Ronald Wellington Brown, Esq.*
INTRODUCTION
Transborder Data Flow ("TBDF") is international communication.
The term international information transfer is preferable,1 though TBDF
* A.B., 1967, Rutgers University; J.D., 1971, Harvard Law School; M.B.A., 1973, Harvard
Graduate School of Business Administratidn; Staff Counsel, Consumer Products and Services, at
World Headquarters of ITT Corporation.
I Some of the reasons for this preference are presented in Appendix I. Other commentators are
also recognizing a need to consign the phrase "transborder data flow" to history. See, e.g., State-
ment by the Business and Industry Advisory Council of OECD, Transborder Data Flows In The
International Firm, presented at the Second OECD Symposium on Transborder Data Flows, in
London, England (Dec. 1983) [hereinafter cited as BIAC Statement]:
Another thing that many international business executives agree upon is that the coining of the
phase Transborder Data Flows can, with hindsight, be seen as having been, in some respects,
unfortunate and its subsequent misuse as having led to unintended results. The time has surely
come for it to be dropped altogether or at least for it to be used much more precisely. Unfortu-
nate because there are many different issues requiring different approaches although repeated
use of the term has focused attention on a single form of international communication, i.e., data
traffic, giving the false impression that data is the dominant form of information transfer and
that unlike the telephone or ordinary mail it is a source of many problems. It is this false focus,
rather than the presence of significant problems, that has attracted so much attention to data
transmission.
Id. at 1.
Now all too frequently one hears in the corridors the feeling expressed that we are caught up in
debates that are unreal and even to a degree contrived, that some of the so-called issues that
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is the more widely used term. In this Perspective, the terms TBDF and
international information transfer will be used interchangeably. Either
term can be defined, somewhat elaborately, as the electronic transmission
of personal or non-personal information across political boundaries for
processing, or storing in computer files.2 More simply, TBDF is interna-
tional movement of information over transnational computer-communi-
cation systems. Transfer of information over transnational computer
systems is the underlying concept.3 Proposed or actual restrictions on
such transfers are the underlying problem.4 Interests advanced or re-
strained by policies applicable to such transfers are the underlying
importance.5
have fallen under [the] heading [of Transborder Data Flow] are non events. . . . If there is a
connection, it is that all these concerns are symptomatic of the need for society to adapt its
institutions and procedures to the development of information technology. In so far as any
omnibus heading is needed, many would indeed prefer "Information Technology....
Id. at 2.
Another phrase gaining currency is "international information flows" which seems at least to
capture the wider context missed by Transborder Data Flow, and to underscore the comple-
mentary and interchangeable nature of the communications media.
Id. at 3. See also P. Robinson, TBDF: The International Environment, a presentation to the Work-
shop on Microelectronics, Information Technology and Canadian Society, Queens University, King-
ston (May 5-7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Robinson, Environment]:
"Transborder Data Flow" (TBDF) is a string of words that is becoming more widely bandied
about internationally and here in Canada. It is a label used to represent a range of often com-
plex and sensitive public policy issues. Many of these issues are concerned with what happens
to the data and information before and after they flow, rather than directly with the flow per se.
Without the flow, the issues would not, of course, arise but the label is misleading because
it tends to put all emphasis on flow.
Id. at 1. See also P. Robinson, Transborder Data Flow: International Dimensions, a Presentation to
the XV National Conference on Informatics, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Oct. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Robinson, Dimensions]:
Transborder Data Flow is an expression that causes eyes to glaze over, and minds to switch off
and turn on to other things. I have seen it many times with friends and colleagues. It is unfor-
tunate that we cannot think of a better label-one that would indicate more clearly the range of
issues covered, and one that would highlight their growing importance to all countries.
Id. at 1.
2 See Fishman, Introduction to Transborder Data Flows, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980).
3 See Rutkowski, Role of Direct Broadcasting Satellites In The Integrated Communications En-
vironment, VI TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. 41 (1983):
A number of rapidly evolving advances in telecommunication technology, combined with in-
creasing demands within our society for the rapid and efficient collection, processing and dis-
semination of all forms of information, is producing entirely new kinds of telecommunication
and information networks. The capabilities now exist to convert at increasingly lower cost all
speech, music, television pictures and textual information to a common digital representation.
In such a converted form, the information can be handled by computers which can process,
store or disseminate it through transmission systems under their control. Indeed, the term
"information transport" is increasingly replacing the word telecommunication to more appro-
priately describe the movement of information in this new integrated environment.
4 See, eg., Markowski, Telecommunications Regulations as Barriers to the Transborder Flow of
Information, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287 (1981).
5 See Novotny, Transborder Data Flows and International Law: A Framework for Policy-Ori-
ented Inquiry, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 141 (1980).
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Though definitions are fairly simple, the issues raised by TBDF are
not. For example, in establishing national or international policy on
such information flows, should the general rule be free flow of informa-
tion or restricted flow of information?6 When is information "speech"?
What ideological assumptions, social and legal norms should be reflected
in policy?7 Should the information be treated differently depending on
whether it is technical, journalistic, economic, financial, commercial, cul-
tural, or personal? Should the volume or kind of information be consid-
ered in determining whether to license8 or tax its movement?9 Should we
attempt to classify information for TBDF purposes apart from other uses
to which the information may be put?10 Should it make any difference
whether the medium of information flow is a private leased line, public
network, a signal through the air between earth stations and a satellite,
or an envelope through the mails? Is "broadcasting" part of TBDF?.1
These are difficult questions without easy answers. They demonstrate
6 Id. at 173.
7 Id. at 159.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 162-166.
9 See ARTHUR D. LITTLE DECISION RESOURCES, IMPACT REPORT ON THE REGULATION OF
TRANSNATIONAL DATA FLOW, (Mar. 1981) [hereinafter cited as A.D.L. IMPACT REPORT]:
While most of the activities of national governments have focused on issues of data protec-
tion, sovereignty, vulnerability, and U.S. dominance, it is important to recognize a number of
economic factors that lend strong support to these activities. For example, the export of origi-
nal data for processing, followed by later re-import in processed form, has local employment
impacts in a high-technology industry sector that most developed nations are seeking to stimu-
late. There is increasing support for the view that the original (unprocessed) data represent
national resources, which should be exported only under the same conditions that apply to the
export of other national resources. Meanwhile, in the larger economic context in which these
issues are being raised, the evolution of the more developed countries into service-based econo-
mies, already well advanced in OECD nations, has called into question the appropriateness and
effectiveness of existing tax structures, which were developed for primarily manufacturing econ-
omies.
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that the idea has arisen that data and informa-
tion might be made subject to taxation. This possibility first arose in connection with the export
of raw textual data for transcription onto magnetic tapes for computer input. This practice is
now quite common, with Far Eastern countries, including Korea and Singapore, the most popu-
lar locations for such transcriptions. The transcribed magnetic tapes, when returned to their
owners, clearly have had value added out of all proportion to any customs charges that might be
calculated on the value of blank tapes. With the steady increase in the availability of data and
information in computer-compatible form (either when originally prepared or when transcribed
from raw form), and with the development of high-speed telecommunications data links, this
issue of added value has become increasingly significant. As a result, the concept of taxing
telecommunications export of data and/or imposing a customs or value-added tax on telecom-
munications import of processed data, is now receiving considerable attention, especially for
data having high economic value.
Techniques for imposing such taxes are just beginning to be suggested. A suitable mecha-
nism is likely to be difficult both to develop (since it will depend on careful characterization of
data related to its economic value) and to implement. A taxation approach could have very
significant impact on business operations, particularly if applied to intracompany data flows.
Id. atl0.
10 See infra note 40.
11 See infra note 30.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:1(1984)
that TBDF policy choices touch several legal areas: privacy, 2 intellec-
tual property,1 3 national security, 14 international trade,'5 and economic
development. 1
6
The merger of telecommunication and computers is producing new
information products and services. An emerging information industry,
offering these products and services, and based on applied information
technology, is receiving increased global attention because of the indus-
try's significance for economic growth and international trade. Existing
policies, practices, and arrangements covering telecommunications, com-
puters, communication, and trade will have to be reviewed in the light of
these developments.
This Perspective presents such a review. Part I discusses technologi-
cal change and the information industry. Part II presents concepts of
information flow and national sovereignty. Part III discusses trade and
content aspects of international information transfers. Part IV examines
a model code for transnational commerce, as an approach to facilitating
international information transfers and presents twenty principles for
such a code. Part V examines existing legal concepts and their possible
application to international information transfers. Finally, the Perspec-
tive concludes with a prediction that in the area of international informa-
tion transfers, our limited experience will soon catch up with our vast
expectations.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Typically, and inaccurately, the merger of telecommunications and
computer technology is referred to as the second information revolution.
The first information revolution, again inaccurately, is typically marked
12 See, eg., Coombe & Kirk, Privacy, Data Protection, and Transborder Data Flow, 39 Bus.
LAW. 33 (1983). See also Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter cited as C.O.E. Con-
vention], reprinted in 20 INT'L LEG. MAT. 317 (Mar. 1981).
13 See infra notes 20 and 38.
14 See Novotny, supra note 5, at 160-65.
15 See, e.g., Robinson, Environment, supra note 1, at 3.
Another important area affected by TBDF is trade, and some discussion is now beginning to
focus on trade in telecommunications, data processing and information services. Some coun-
tries are concerned that policies which might evolve to deal with other issues could lead to
increased barriers to trade in these services. And, because TBDF (in one form or another) is
essential to trade in other areas, there is a growing concern that traditional trade may be ad-
versely affected by new policies to deal with TBDF.
16 See, eg., A.D.L. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 9, for a useful TBDF summary of technological




by Johann Gutenberg's invention of movable printing press type 17 replac-
ing the medieval information monopoly of monastic copyists. In both
these revolutions, the results of changes in the technology of communica-
tion-movable type in the so-called first information revolution and bi-
nary digit transmissions in the so-called second information revolution-
are likely to be similar: a broader access to, distribution of, and perhaps
democratization of information;' 8 the growth of new businesses, 19 prod-
ucts, and services; political, economic, social, and linguistic change; and
perhaps most significantly-at least for lawyers-the modification or de-
velopment of a legal framework, sometimes by looking to the past and
making analogies20 after the revolution is well underway.2'
17 See, eg., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 714 (1984).
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in
technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the printing
press-that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. Repeatedly, as new develop-
ments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules
that new technology made necessary ....
... Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when
major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the
constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permuta-
tions of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.
104 S. Ct. at 782-83.
18 The widest dissemination of ideas in the marketplace is a fundamental tenet of democracy.
19 See, eg., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE Doc. No. 373-22/4, INFORMATION
FLOWS-AN INTERNATIONAL BusINEss PERSPEaCTIVE 1 (Rev. 5 1983) [hereinafter cited as ICC
PERSPECTIVE]:
During the past century there has been a close and synergistic relationship between the
development of world trade and communications. As the letter post, telegraph, telephone and
telex were successively introduced, they stimulated productivity and service levels in existing
businesses and enabled new sorts of enterprises to become established. These developments in
turn created user demands for quicker, more reliable, more convenient, cheaper and widely
available services and equipment which led to further innovation. Recently the convergence of
the rapidiy developing technologies of computing and communications has resulted in the intro-
duction of yet another generation of communications media. Starting with data transmission,
there has been a continually growing list of new services like facsimile, electronic mail, videotex
and video conferencing. The rate of technological innovation is accelerating and the only limits
to the services that can be provided seem to be the imagination of the providers and economic
constraints. Like their predecessors, these new services are both supplementing and replacing
existing media. This development of information technology has already had effects on the
interchange of business information both within and across national boundaries, resulting in
economic and social benefits.
20 See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 4 (1983): "Judges and Legislators
have tried to fit technological innovations under conventional legal concepts. The errors of under-
standing by these scientific laymen, though honest, have been mammoth. They have sought to guide
toward good purposes technologies they did not comprehend."
The courts and regulatory agencies in the American system (or other authorities elsewhere)
enter as arbiters of the conflicts among enterpreneurs, interest groups and political organiza-
tions battling for control of the new technology. The arbiters, applying familiar analogies from
the past to their lay image of the new technology, create a partly old, partly new structure of
rights and obligations. The telegraph was analogized to railroads, the telephone to the tele-
graph, and cable television to broadcasting. The legal system thus invented for each new tech-
nology may in some instances, like the First Amendment, be a tour de force of political
creativity, but in other instances it may be less worthy. The system created can turn out to be
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In part, as presented in Figure 1, an information revolution is sug-
gested by some of the telecommunications products and services that
Figure 1 22



































































inappropriate to more habile forms of the technology which gradually emerge as the technology
progresses. This is when problems arise, as they are arising so acutely today.
Id at 7.
American telegraph law might seem to have been modeled on postal regulations, but postal
law was at most the grandfather of telegraph law rather than the father; postal law's impact was
indirect. Telegraph law was modeled rather on the law that had grown up in the nineteenth
century to regulate the new railroads. Railroad law got some of its concepts from the practices
regarding post roads, so indirectly the postal influence is there, but the immediate model for
telegraphy came from the evolving concept of a railroad common carrier.
As a consequence, the First Amendment is almost undetectable in cases concerning teleg-
raphy. It might seem odd that when a new technology of communication came into existence,
the courts did not perceive it as an extension of the printed word, sharing the same significance,
the same infirmities, and the same need for protection as the press whose liberties the courts had
so sedulously guarded. The reason for this dim perception of telegraphy was that the early
telegraph carried so few words at such a high cost that people thought of it not as a medium of
expression but rather as a business machine. The computer suffered the same misperception a
century later.
Id at 91.
21 See, e.g., POOL, supra note 20, at 249:
A workable copyright system is never enacted by law alone. Rather it evolves as a social sys-
tem, which may be bolstered by law. The book and music royalty systems that now exist are
very different from each other, reflecting the different structures of the industries. What the law
does is to put sanctions behind what the parties already consider right. So too with electronic
publishing on computer networks, a normative system must grow out of actual patterns of
work. The law may then lend support to those norms.
22 INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORP., INTEGRATED VOICE AND DATA AP-
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have developed since the telegraph in 1850 and which are projected
through the threshold of the 21st century. We are beginning to see in-
creased international communication competition in, and international
regulation of, information products and services. Developments in tech-
nology have been,23 and will be, accompanied by significant changes in
economics, culture, law, and trade. New technologies24 that involve
some form of information transmission, storage, or processing in an in-
ternational transaction, will have to take account of TBDF legal regula-
tions and requirements. To date, however, the growth rate of
international legal principles applicable to international information ac-
tivities has not matched the growth rate-of information products.2"
Mr. Harvey L. Poppel, a Senior Vice President and Director of Booz
Allen & Hamilton, who has written extensively on the emerging informa-
tion society, defines the information industries upon which such society
is based as including those firms which not only produce information,
but those which also produce the facilities to process, store and distribute
it. As of June 1982, AT&T, IBM, GTE, Eastman Kodak, Phillips, Mat-
sushita, ITT, Xerox, Bell Canada, and RCA were identified by the Booz
Allen research as the top ten firms in the information industry. These
firms generate annual information revenues of more than $145 billion.
That amount is just under one-fourth of the global total for revenues of
the information industry.
PLICATIONS 1 (1980), reprinted with permisson. Figure 1 can be read as a time chart beginning with
the telegraph in 1885 and moving toward the 21st century.
23 See A. Norman, Making An International Business of Information, a paper presented at the
Second OECD Symposium on Transborder Data Flows, in London, England (Dec. 1, 1983) (Mr.
Norman was advisor to the United Kingdom delegation) [hereinafter cited as Norman, International
Business]:
What started with government sponsored market research and development led by Vasco da
Gama and Christopher Columbus grew into the private ventures of enterprising merchants and
great companies. Legal and constitutional innovations-that is changes in the regulatory envi-
ronment-followed in technology's wake: mutual insurance, joint stock and chartered compa-
nies, fractional deposit banking, bills of exchange and stock exchanges ...
We face a similar position today. The users of communications technology have upset our
regulatory arrangements as profoundly as the users of sea routes ....
24 See Figs 2, 3, and 4.
25 See Robinson, Environment, surpa note 1, at 5-6:
That current legislation is inadequate to deal with misuse of data is amply demonstrated by a
case in Alberta, where an individual was accused and convicted, of illegal use of telecommuni
cations facilities, when in fact he had used a terminal to gain unauthorized access to a university
computer. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the conviction was squashed, because
the Court decided unanimously that the university computer system was a data facility, not a
telecommunication facility.
This lag between technological growth and emerging legal principles seems typical rather than ex-
traordinary. See infra text accompanying notes 27-46.
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A technology called embedded processing, presented in Figure 2,
binds the industry together. The Office of the Future, involving linked
voice, data and text communication operating in an Integrated Services
Digital Network ("ISDN") environment, presented in Figure 3, is one
example of the use of embedded processing. An automated banking
machine is another example.
In its simplest form, this technology combines science, technology,
and engineering with management techniques used in information han-
dling and processing to produce information products and services. The
last stage of embedded processing will, according to Poppel, enable a per-
son who works in such an electronic environment to exchange informa-
tion through computerized information systems and have access to
electronically stored information regardless of such person's geographic
location. Thus, embedded processing in an ISDN environment may pro-
vide the technological equivalent of Article 19 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, whose text is as follows: "Everyone has the right
to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to







Information Delivery in an Integrated Services
Digital Network
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, arid impart infor-
mation and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."28 As
Figure 4 illustrates, communication, computers, and microelectronics
form the three foundations of the information technology underlying the
growth of the information industry. These foundations make up much of
the environment in which transborder data flow issues involving commu-
27 INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORP., 56 ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATION
No. 1, at 10 (1981), reprinted with permission.
28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217 A III, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71(1948).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:1(1984)





1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
onicot ion]
Historically, transitions in the technology or media of communica-
tion also have been accompanied by cultural change.30 Contemporary
concerns range from what will happen to print publishing,31 and the defi-
29 Advertisement from Financial Times, June 1, 1982, at 9, col. 1.
30 See, eg., Innis, Minerva's Owl, in THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION 31-32 (1951).
31 See Starr, The Electronic Reader, DAEDALUS, Winter, 1983, at 143.
In the last several decades, new technology has greatly altered the production of the
printed word without much affecting how it is distributed or read. Computerized composition,
phototypesetting, and word processors have changed the editorial rooms of newspapers and the
printing systems of nearly all publishers, but readers can scarcely tell the difference. The devel-
opment of electronics promises to change this pattern, to alter reading as well as publishing.
Id "Print.. . is not about to disappear.. . . Books can be conveniently carried to the beach, to
the bathroom, and to bed. The printed page neither blinks nor malfunctions; and almost alone
among man-made objects, it has never even been accused of causing cancer". Id at 144. See also
Lacy, Reading in an Audiovisual and Electronic Era, DAEDALUS, Winter, 1983, at 117. "Enthusi-
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nition of literacy3 2 (Which computer languages do you read and write?)
to concerns with preserving common values which uniquely establish a
national identity."3
I do not believe there is any way to accommodate our own First
Amendment values with a trade view of information on content. There
asts for the new information technology believe that it will replace or diminish the role of a whole
series of industries and institutions: the newspaper, the journal, the book, the library."
Id. at 120.
It is well for our society that the audiovisual and electronic revolutions have complemented
print, not replaced it, and that reading vigorously survives as the means of establishing a bridge
of meaning, both human and thoughtful, between ourselves and the totality beyond us: a bridge
between our culture and other cultures, between ourselves and the infinitely vast and infinitely
microscopic world of science, and between our present and the past and the future. Without
reading, meaning and comprehension could dissolve into "feeling" or splinter into data, the
awareness and integrity of individual identity and purpose could be but ill sustained, and
Bruke's sense of society as an all-embracing compact of the living with the dead and those yet
unborn could not be achieved.
Id. at 127.
32 See Compaine, The New Literacy, DAEDALUS, Winter, 1983, at 129, 137.
Historically, the development of a literacy has gone through identifiable stages. Literacy starts
with specialists, and then begins to have a wider impact on institutions. ... Finally, it be-
comes so pervasive that even the masses are considered to be handicapped without it. Today,
we are perhaps at the threshold of an era where the computer is becoming so simple to use and
inexpensive that the masses can use it without having to understand how it works. They can
thus participate in computer literacy without necessarily being computer-literate.
Id. at 138.
It is likely that we are on the verge of yet another step in the evolution of literacy. Yet we
can feel confident that whatever comes about will not replace existing skills, but supplement
them. Neither the printing press nor the typewriter replaced either speech or handwriting. The
electronic hand calculator has not replaced the need to understand mathematics, though it may
reduce the need to memorize multiplication tables.
Id. at 14041.
...Marshall McCluhan was off base. The medium, by and large, is not the message. The
message is the content, and the medium is the way it is conveyed and displayed. Content-the
ideas, knowledge, story, information, and so on-is the work of an author, a producer, a pho-
tographer. Technology, history, and even politics play a role in how this content is processed
and the format in which it is ultimately displayed. Process incorporates the gathering, handling,
storage and transmission of the content; it may involve typewriters, computers, file cabinets;
telephone lines, broadcasting towers, printing presses; and trucks and retail stores. Format is
the manner of display-such as ink on paper, sound from a vibrating speaker cone, images on a
cathode ray tube, light projected through a film, and so on. Thus the content may be quite
independent of the medium.
Id. at 32.
33 See Television Advertising Between Friends, Notes for an Address by The Honorable Jeanne
Sauve to a Joint Meeting of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters and the National Association
of Broadcasters in Toronto, Canada 7-8 (June 29, 1978).
Exposure to essentially American experiences and values has its effect on Canadian society. A
survey of thirteen-year old students in British Columbia shows what I mean. When asked by
their teacher to name famous Canadians, they listed Jimmy Carter, Daniel Boone, Evel Knievel
and Gerald Ford. Examples like this make us aware just how fragile our culture is.
Our cultural concerns have led us to declare in our Broadcasting Act of 1968 that "the
Canadian broadcasting system should be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians so as to
safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada."
Although the U.S. Communications Act of 1934 requires majority American ownership of the
airwaves, the Act itself does not impose similar requirements on U.S. broadcasters.
Id at 6.
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must be, in my view, at least a "safe harbor" for such information as
news in the stream of communication regardless of the technology by
which it is transferred, and the information which might be caught in the
net of a proposal like that presented by a French Minister for customs
valuation of software in the stream of commerce.34
Expanding technology usually challenges the capacity of law and
lawyers to keep up with it." This is nothing new. Technology may be
like the fabled hare, but law seems to have the fabled tortoise's capacity
to catch up. As Professor William W. Bishop, University of Michigan
Professor of Law, has noted:
In many areas new international law has been developed to deal with new
problems caused by expanding technology. I mention the growth of inter-
national aviation law, the development of space law, of the international
law of telecommunications, and the slow growth of international law deal-
ing with transnational pollution, especially of the sea. All this has been
chiefly by treaty. One might also speak of the international law of trade,
commerce, and finance, thinking particularly of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund,
commodity agreements .... 36
Any of the three foundations of information technology may create con-
cern for a special field of TBDF law to deal with those problems.37
34 On January 20, 1983, the GATT Committee on Customs Valuation released a proposed deci-
sion on computer software under Article VII of GATT in response to a United States proposal. The
Parties to GAT under the Decision, interpreting the Article, would agree that:
In determining the Customs Value of imported carrier media bearing data or instructions,
only the cost of [sic] value of the carrier medium itself shall be taken into account. The Cus-
toms Value shall not, therefore, include the cost or value of th data or instructions, provided
that this is distinguished from the cost or the value of the carrier medium.
For the purpose of this decision, the expression "carrier medium" shall not be taken to
include integrated circuits, semiconductors and similar devices or articles incorporating such
circuits or devices; the expression "data or instructions" shall not be taken to include, sound,
cinematic, or video recordings.
The Decision would attempt to insure uniformity of treatment in valuation of "imported carrier
media bearing data or instructions for use in automatic data-processing equipment" by excluding the
"value of data and instructions" from dutiable value of carrier medium.
35 See POOL, supra note 20.
36 Bishop, International Law 1906-1981, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 7 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
PROCEEDINGS].
37 See BIAC Statement, supra note 1, at 5:
From time to time suggestions are made that the advent of Information Technology de-
mands the development of some new and separate framework of "computer law". BIAC be-
lieves such an approach to be misconceived. ... It would in any case seem inappropriate and
ill advised to place diverse applications such as electronic funds management, computer crime,
broadcasting and software protectors within the same instruments simply because they use re-
lated technology. Do we have or need "electric motor law"?
See generally Comment, Transborder Data Flow: Problems with the Council of Europe Convention,
or Protecting States from Protectionism, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 601 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, TBDF Problems]. "Data protection has been recognized as a new branch of law formu-
lated especially for handling the issue of invasion of privacy in regard to computerized data. At the
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Obviously some of the laws identified by Professor Bishop will be
applicable when TBDF technology involves telecommunications 38  or
space.39 However, even at the basic terrestrial level of a semiconductor
chip, one of the foundations of information technology,' national courts
and policy makers today are wrestling with fundamental legal questions.
Is a semiconductor chip a writing?41 Is a sui generis statute42 re-
quired to protect such a chip? Should information, like tangible goods,
be subject to customs inspection,43 or if the information is contained on
base of the controversy lies the question of whether the law can ever keep pace with a rapidly
changing science." Id. at 602 n.8.
The United States has a special interest in maintaining the free flow of information. Infor-
mation flow is likely to control almost all trade, either because trade consists directly of infor-
mation exchanges, or because the conduct of trade is totally dependent on information exchange
systems. Since the United States is currently the world leader in information technology and
trade, international restrictions on the information industry most likely will affect United States
business interests more than those of any other country. There could be a severe reduction in
the currently massive amounts of United States revenue from the international information
industry if burdensome regulations decrease the utility of information exchange systems.
Id. at 604-05 (footnotes omitted).
38 See supra note 4.
39 See infra note 224.
40 See Fig. 4.
41 In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied Apple's motion for a preliminary
injunction against Franklin's using, copying, selling, or infringing Apple's copyrights in computer
programs stored in read only memory ("ROM") semiconductor chips, in part because the District
Court had doubts about the copyrightability of these ROM stored programs. On appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded. Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). The Circuit Court read the district court opinion as
raising four issues, of which three were (1) whether copyright can exist in a computer program
expressed in object code, (2) whether copyright can exist in a computer program embodied in a
ROM, and (3) whether copyright can exist in a computer's operating system program. Id. at 1246.
Relying in part on its earlier decision in Williams Electronics v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d
Cir. 1982), that "the copyrightability of computer programs is firmly established after the 1980
amendment to the Copyright Act," id. at 875, and that a copyrightable work does not have to "be
intelligible to human beings and.. . be intended as a medium of communication to human beings,"
idL at 876-77, the Circuit Court held: (1) a computer program, whether in object code or source code
is a "literary work" under the Copyright statute, and is protected from unauthorized copying,
whether from its object or source code version; (2) a computer program embedded in a ROM chip is
an appropriate subject of copyright since it satisfies the copyright rquirement of fixation; (3) copy-
right can exist in an operating system since such a system is within the statutory definition of a
computer program. Id. at 1249-52. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d
521 (9th Cir. 1984), which also held that microprocessor computer chips are copyrightable. For a
discussion of some of the terms used in this case see Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A
Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 339, 341 (1983); Note, Copyright Protection of Computer
Program Object Code, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1723 (1983). For a discussion of software in the United
Kingdom, see Bishop, Legal Protection of Computer Programs in the United Kingdom, 5 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 269 (1983).
42 The Semiconductor Protection Act of 1984 created sui generis protection for the mask works
or topography of semiconductor chip design.
43 See Norman, International Business, supra note 23, at 3:
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computer software, be valued for purposes of customs duties?44 Does the
use of computers raise new questions concerning protection,4 5 author-
ship,46 or compensation for use of copyrightable material?47 At the same
When tangible goods cross our borders, they pass through customs inspections. Can informa-
tion imports be checked for the equivalent of narcotics or rabbies carriers? We would not want
to import pornography or "video nasties," nor provide secret communications channels for
technology transfer between terrorists. Yet any conceivable control which might be effective
would throttle the free trade in information we are seeking. . . [R]egulations that depend on
an ability to draw distinctions between indistinguishable data flows are unworkable. Yet we
want to distinguish between information of commercial value and of none in order to protect
intellectual property and to earn revenue from the information trade.
44 Carriers who do not know the content of what they are carrying can not set tariffs depen-
dent on content. Nor can the carrier provide the censor with the means of censorship. So
content will have to be regulated at source or destination, not in transit. Our fear is that others
may try to regulate the effects of data flow by regulating the flows itself [sic] installing the
equivalent of customs barriers at which data packages must be opened for inspection.
Id. at 4.
In 1982, the United States proposed to the GATT Committee on Customs Valuation that
charges relating to the information component of computer software be excluded from dutiable
value. In November 1983, the European Communities offered a compromise which stated that
although "transaction value" was the primary basis for valuation, it would be consistent with the
spirit and objectives of the Agreement for those countries in a position to do so to treat the informa-
tion component of computer software as non-dutiable. The European Communities compromise
was adopted at the October 1984 meeting of the committee. OECD countries with ad valorem tariffs
for software are expected to use this alternate method of valuation, producing lower tariffs on
software.
45 For a fuller discussion of some legal problems in protecting semiconductor chip designs, see
1983 Committee Reports, Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, presented at the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia. See also POOL, supra note 20, at 215:
A computer program may operate on raw numerical data and from that data generate a
readable report on trends, averages, and correlations. Another program may operate on articles
and, without human intervention, generate abstracts of them. Certainly, the computer program
that does is itself a text and is copyrightable under present law. But what of the text that the
program generates? Who is the author of the computer-written report or abstract? The com-
puter? The idea that a machine is capable of intellectual labor is beyond the scope of the copy-
right statutes. Can a computer infringe copyright?
46 At the Second OECD Symposium on Transborder Data Flows, in London, England (Dec.
1983), Erik Tersmedens, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Justice, Sweden, presented a paper entitled A
Harmonized Approach in Settling the Copyright Problems arising from the Use of Computers for
Access to Protected Works [hereinafter cited as the Swedish Proposal]. The Swedish proposal rec-
ommended OECD member countries follow suggestions made by copyright experts from the United
Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization, as well as the World Intellectual Property
Organization that "states should consider the desireability of express recognition under their na-
tional laws of the exclusive right of the author to make his work available to the public by means of
computer systems from which a perceivable version of the work may be obtained." .td at 9. Endors-
ing the UNESCO/WIPO view that "copyright problems arising from the use of computers and data
networks for access to works could be solved within the framework of the existing Berne Convention
and Universal Copyright Convention," idi at 4, the Swedish Proposal went on to suggest possible
amendment of legislation in all states "so that all kinds of output from computerized information
systems fall within the exclusive rights of the author." Id at 8.
47 See POOL, supra note 20, at 249:
[C]opyright enforcement must be adapted to the technology. This exceptional control on
communication is specifically allowed by the Constitution as a means of aiding dissemination,
not restricting it. Copyright is temporary and requires publication. It was designed for the
specific technology of the printing press. It is in its present form ill adapted to the new technol-
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level, experts are trying to determine whether copyright is an adequate
form of legal protection for software,48 and video games are providing
ogies. The objective of copyright is beyond dispute. Intellectual effort needs compensation.
Without it, effort will wither. But to apply a print scheme of compensation to the fluid dialogue
of interactive electronic publishing will not succeed. Given modern technologies, there is no
conceivable way that individual copies can be effectively protected from reproduction when they
are already either on a sheet of paper or in a computer's memory. The task is to design new
forms of market organization that will provide compensation and at the same time reflect the
character of the new technology.
48 A Committee of Experts on the Legal Protection of Computer Software, the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization ("WIPO") held its second session June 13-17, 1983, in Geneva, Switzer-
land. Thirty countries, five intergovernmental organizations, sixteen international nongovernmental
organizations, and four associations were in attendance. Among other matters, the meeting consid-
ered a draft Treaty for the Protection of Computer Software and the extent to which protection for
computer software already exists and is sufficient under national or international law. The Report
adopted by the Committee of Experts, LPCS/II/6, Annex I (June 17, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
"WIPO Report"] presented the following positions:
Federal Republic of Germany Software is a work under copyright law of the F.R.G., and
therefore copyright protection is available to computer
software.
Id. at 2.
United States of America Recent amendment to the United States Copyright Act (17
USC §§ 106, 117 as amended by Pub. L. 96-517, dated
December 12, 1980, 94 STAT. 3028-29), made it clear that
computer programs are protected by copyright law. A sui
generis treaty would be required only it "present reliance on
copyright and patent protection were found to be inade-
quate."
Id at 3.
Japan It is "not yet possible to state Japan's uniform position with
respect to the protection of computer software."
Id.
Netherlands Reliance should as much as possible be placed on "existing
conventions in order to secure protection of computer
software", and a sui generis approach "could only be appro-
priate if copyright was not sufficient.
Id.
Denmark Copyright law applies to protection of computer software.
Id
France Copyright law applies to protection of computer software,
but one has to examine "whether all the acts against which
protection was desired were covered by the copyright law."
Same position as Netherlands on sui generis statute.
Id
Hungary Copyright applies to computer software. If an additional
treaty is needed, conclude the treaty under Article 20 of the
Berne Convention.
IA at 4.
Italy Existing conventions do not clearly cover protection of com-
puter software.
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almost as much legal discussion and litigation4 9 as entertainment.
II. SOVEREIGNTY AND FREE FLOW
In Europe, prior to the International Telegraph Convention of
1865,50 territorial concepts of sovereignty resulted in international
messages being telegraphed to the last territorial outpost of one state,
transcribed, and physically carried to the adjoining state, to be retrans-
mitted telegraphically. 5 This literal gateway approach to international
information flow, may have a modern counterpart. For example, Arthur
D. Little, Inc. has observed: "The free flow of information across inter-
national borders, requires that senders and receivers, either conform to
agreed upon standards, or translate between standards at gateways, or
interfaces between systems with different internal standards."52 The lit-
eral gateway is also an early example of the competing principles of sov-
ereignty and free flow of information.53
Other aspects of competition between sovereignty and free flow of
information exist in the areas of economics and trade, as well as privacy,
data protection, and fair information practices.5" Competing considera-
tions of sovereignty and free transfer are also reflected in policy choices
in three areas of international information transfer: economics and
trade; privacy and fair information policies; and science and technology.
Should data protection laws encourage or inhibit exports of information
through taxes or tariffs? Should individuals have no, limited, or broad
access to computer records containing personal information? How nar-
row or broad should the scope of liability be if those records are inaccu-
rate, or used for purposes beyond those for which they were originally
compiled? Should technical and scientific data be subject to broad re-
Union of Industries of the
European Community Major software producers and users do not need a new
treaty.
Id. at 5.
Computer Law Association and
Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations For now, copyright "appeared to be sufficient for protection
of computer software."
Id. at 6.
49 For a partial listing of recent videogame litigation, see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 818 n.8 (N.D. Pa. 1982).
50 See Fishman, supra note 2, at 16.
51 See A.D.L. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 9.
52 Id. at 9.
53 See Novotny, supra note 5, at 173.




strictions on transfer or to limited restrictions based on such considera-
tions as national security, alternative availability, scarcity, etc.? How
should conflicts of jurdisdiction or issues of extraterritoriality be consid-
ered in the area of international information transfers? If State "A"
makes a different policy choice than State "B", will it be possible for an
international information transfer to occur between these two states?
Can the interests of the two states be accommodated? Does the U.K.
Data Protection Act reflect voluntary principled answers to these ques-
tions or involuntary pragmatic answers to prevent data transfer proscrip-
tions by Council of Europe members?
The most recent version of the International Telecommunication
Convention5 continues to reflect this competition at the gateway, in af-
firming both the public's rights in communication, and the state's rights,
to stop covered communication "which may appear dangerous to the se-
curity of the state, or contrary to law, public order or decency." 56 The
validated license treatment of unpublished technical data in the current
United States Export Administration Control Regulations, 57 is another
example of the competing principles of sovereignty or perhaps national
security and free flow of information.
In addition to the International Telecommunication Union, other
bodies and groups have begun in the last decade, to focus on other as-
pects of international information transfer. For example, the Council of
Europe's 1980 TBDF Convention58 emerged from a 1970s study of the
need for international control mechanisms for transfers of individual
medical data. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment ("OECD"),59 the European Economic Community,6"
55 See International Telecommunications Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2497, T.I.A.S.
No. 8572. See also Fishman, supra note 2, at 5.
56 See A.D.L. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 9, at 25.
57 22 C.F.R. § 125.01-.24 (1984).
58 C.O.E. Convention, supra note 12.
The Convention will come into force three months after instruments of ratification are filed with
the Council by five member states. On May 23, 1984, the Portuguese Parliament approved ratifica-
tion, thus making Portugal the fifth ratifying state after France, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
59 See, eg., text accompanying notes 65, 66, and 79.
60 Overcoming barriers to trade in information products and services may prove difficult even
within such an institution as the European Common Market, despite provisions in Articles 48, 52, 59
and 67 of the Treaty of Rome [Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958)] calling for the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital. The Commission of the European Communities Country Report, Some
Views on Transborder Data Flows and Information Market Policy presented by C. Jansen Van
Rosendaal, at the Second OECD Symposium on Transborder Data Flows, at 4-5, contains the fol-
lowing assessment of the European information market:
0 The Information Market is fragmented and does not make optimal use of the economies of
scale that the size of the Community Market offers.
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UNESCO,61 the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics,62 and the
UN Center on Transnational Corporations,63 have focused on, or are
now focusing on, personal privacy, economics, trade, and national devel-
opment aspects of TBDF. Information transfer policies of the United
States of America, Brazil, and the EEC illustrate some contemporary
concerns.
0 A balanced development of the market in all Member States needs to make use of the full
potential of the economies of scale of the European market. The economies of information
networks and services are such that the more widely accessible they are, the greater is their
viability. Imbalances between Member States, such as major differences in the timing of the
introduction of essential infrastructures (such as networks) and services jeopardize develop-
ment and widens rather than narrows the gap between them.
o There is a risk that instead of the necessary convergence between national policies towards
a common Community goal, the need to adapt to the fast changing information environ-
ment will generate growing incompatibilities between national structures. This will place
serious constraints on the evolution of the information society. Two areas, for instance,
where rules and regulations will shape the Community information market in the next de-
cades are the value-added service end of the telecommunications spectrum and the status of
new types of information services based on sophisticated technologies (where traditional
distinctions, such as that between specialized and mass-media services, are becoming
blurred).
o In the information market for new services, lack of clarification of the respective roles of the
public and private sectors creates uncertainty and unclear competitive situations which can
become disincentives for private investment in the industry and the healthy development of
the market.
Mr. Van Rosendaal concludes that:
Greater efforts are now needed in the Community to create a European Information Market
Policy framework which will ensure the proper market conditions for the information-related
industry to flourish and enable the Community to play its role on the world information scene.
The absence of such a policy framework has the potential to generate (and in many cases is
already generating) market distortions and non-technical barriers to trade, the full impact of
which is not yet entirely felt. Such distortions must be avoided by stimulating a sound and
balanced evolution of our information society. To achieve this a coherent set of internationally
accepted 'rules of the game' needs to be formulated in order to serve as a common basis for
national information policies in the European Community.
Id. at 8-9.
61 See Fishman, supra note 2, at 16. See also Report of the Director-General of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on the Second Intergovernmental Confer-
ence on Strategies and Policies for Informatics E/1982/89/Add. 1 (June 7, 1982).
62 Id.
63 The United Nations Centre on Transnationa Corporations has produced many papers on
TBDF. See, e.g., Transnational Corporations and Transborder Data Flows: An Overview, E/C.10/
87 and Corr. 1 (July 6, 1981); Transnational Corporations and Transborder Data Flows: A Techni-
cal Paper, U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.A.4 (1982); Transnational Corporations and Transborder Data
Flows: Programme of Work and Progress Report, E/C.10/1982/12 (June 18, 1982); Secretary-Gen-
eral's Note Verbale on Transnational Corporations and Transborder Data Flows, E/C.10/1982/
CRP.1 (Sept. 2, 1982); Preliminary Investigation of Transborder Data Flows in Japan, E/C.10/
1982/CRP.2 (Sept. 7, 1982); Programme of Work on Transnational Corporations and Transborder
Data Flows, The CTC Reporter 11, 12-13 (Spring 1982), U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.A.15 (1982); Trans-
border Data Flows: Access to the International On-line Data-base Market, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.II.A.1 (1983); Transborder Data Flows and Brazil:: Brazilian Case Study, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.II.A.3 (1983); Transnational Corporations and Transborder Data Flows: Progress Report, E/
C.10/1983/12 (Apr. 28, 1983); and Transborder Data Flows and Poland: Progress Report on the
Polish Case Study, E/C.10/IX/WP.2 (Apr. 25, 1983).
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A. United States Policy on International Communications
Four years ago, an official statement of United States policy on in-
ternational communications was prepared by the Department of State
and submitted to Congress. That statement, contained in Senate Report
No. 95842, referred to an Interagency Task Force on TBDF Research
and Policy Coordination, chaired by the Department of State and the
National Telecommunications and Information Agency ("NTIA"). The
task force has been operating according to nine broad objectives:
1. To assure U.S. multinationals and others, of non-discriminatory access
to low cost, efficient information systems.
2. To assure non-discriminatory commercial opportunity for U.S. firms,
that are marketing international data processing and data bank
services.
3. To participate in developing, international computer, data processing,
software, and encryption standards.
4. To protect the privacy of personal data of U.S. nationals.
5. To support general access to scientific and technical data bases.
6. To respond to international concern about U.S. domination of interna-
tional computer and data processing, and the reliability of access to
U.S. bases.
7. To encourage U.S. access to foreign advances in hardware, and
software technologies.
8. To encourage foreign governments to restrict their privacy laws to cov-
erage of natural persons.
9. To provide a functional system for government-to-government ex-
change of data, with due regard to national security, and personal
privacy.64
Since the 1979 report, there have been several developments.
Among the developments are preparation of a paper by NTIA on the
Foundations of United States Information Policy (presented at the
OECD's High Level Conference on Information, Computers and Com-
munications Policy held in Paris);61 several bills introduced in Congress,
such as H.R. 1957 (The International Communications Reorganization
Act of 1981), and S. 821 (providing for the creation of an International
Telecommunications and Information Task Force);66 the appointment of
Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan as Coordinator for International Com-
munications and Information Policy, in the United States State Depart-
64 SEN. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 98TH CONG., IST SESS.,
LONG-RANGE GOALS IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION: AN OUT-
LINE FOR UNITED STATES POLICY (Comm. Print 1983).
65 NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF UNITED STATES INFORMATION POLICY, NTIA-SPo80-8
(1980).
66 SEN. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 97TH CONG., IST SESS. FED-
ERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AUTHORIZATIONS ACT OF 1981, at 2. (May 15, 1981).
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ment; the appointment of Walter Wriston as consultant on International
Communication and Information Technology Policy to Secretary of
State George Schultz; and creation by the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984 of a Telecommunications Policy Study Commission. A pro-
posed United States country study for submission to the UN Centre on
Transnational Corporations also continues to receive attention.6 7
In December 1983, United States Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan
presented a keynote address at the OECD Second Symposium on Trans-
border Data Flows. In that address, Ambassador Dougan supplemented
prior statements of United States policy with several points on current
United States policy. She stated:
1. The views of the United States on what we should do in the interna-
tional community on Trade in Telecommunications Services are well
known. We support discussion of these matters in GATT and are par-
ticipating in the OECD consideration of trade in services and high
technology. Last year we introduced in the ICCP [Information, Com-
puters, and Communications Policy Committee] a draft declaration on
data which has been an ongoing topic in the deliberations of the Work-
ing Group on Transborder Flows. We hope that these efforts will
culminate in a consensus on a Declaration of Principles for an open
system of international information flows.
2. [W]e are deeply concerned that human rights not be lost in the hum
and whir of the computer age. The right to privacy, the right to know,
and the right to free expression must be protected.
3. We recognize that "freedom of information" is subject to widely vary-
ing definitions, and that such freedom is not absolute. At the same
time, my government will always insist the burden of proof is on those
who claim a restriction is necessary. If the purpose of such restrictions
is the protection of the public order, or the rights of property, or the
denial of military technology to potential adversaries, those concerns
should be stated candidly and clearly.
4. We cannot accept such broad generalizations as the "protection of cul-
tural integrity" to be a sufficient justification for information control,
particularly as these are too often only a guise for economic protection-
ism or censorship of the press.
5. We recognize, at the same time, that those who transmit information,
and who seek themselves protection of such rights, must respect the
rights of others as well.
6. We consider the free flow of international information as an extension
of our domestic democratic traditions. Our laws and regulations are
designed to encourage maximum access to information and minimize
its abuse.
7. We applaud the leadership which the OECD Committee for Informa-
67 See The Role of Transnational Corporations In Transborder Data Flows, Report to the Ninth




tion, Computer and Communications Policy has provided in working
toward an international response to computer crime, and we will re-
main an enthusiastic partner in that effort. Nowhere is an imaginative
international response more essential than in the trade in telecommuni-
cations services.
8. It is not enough for our governments to work with each other for polit-
ical consensus on the issues of international telecommunications. We
must also explore with our private industries the practical conse-
quences of political decision.
68
In addition to these positions, the United States also presented a
country paper indicating four specific areas in which the OECD could
play a role in assessing the broad implications of telecommunications
policy in coming years: (1) promote cooperation among OECD members
as these member countries define national telecommunications policies;
(2) assist in establishing compatible policies governing the availability
and provision of telecommunications and information services; (3) serve
as a forum for discussion of specific issues identified by member coun-
tries; (4) incorporate telecommunications policies into formulation of na-
tional priorities in the areas of international trade and direct investment.
Some of these suggestions on the possible OECD role in transborder data
flows were also echoed in the remarks of the Honorable Justice M.D.
Kirby, Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission, on the last
day of the Symposium.69
68 Keynote Address by Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan, OECD Second Symposium on TBDF,
in London, England 11-13 (Dec. 1983). The author was one of four private sector representatives in
the 16 member U.S. delegation to the symposium.
69 On December 2, 1983, The Honorable Justice M.D. Kirby presented a paper ("Legal Issues-
An Overview") at the Second OECD Symposium on Transborder Data Flows in London, England.
In a subsection of that paper, "Ten Questions-Towards A Role For OECD," Justice Kirby raised
the following issues:
1. [I]s there an overall viable concept of "information law" into which. . . [these] issues...
can be collected? . . . [Clan we simply draft new laws to meet specific problems in a
piecemeal way in all of our countries-uncoordinated and in ignorance of developments
elsewhere?
2. If it is premature to articulate a concept of TBDF law, as such, is there nonetheless a
"shopping list" of immediately available practical problems which can be identified and
which OECD is a useful forum or the useful forum in which to tackle them?
3. If we have such a "shopping list"-whether it is copyright for the protection of property
rights, extension of privacy rights, insurance against liability, computer crime, freedom of
information interaction, vulnerability or whatever-what should be the priorities on that
agenda?
4. What are the underlying values which should determine both the identification of OECD
legal tasks and the way in which those tasks are to be tackled?
5. What approach should be taken to cost benefit analysis in the legal regulation of TBDF?
Are there some identified wrongs or problems which, in the nature of TBDF technology,
are just too difficult or expensive to regulate?...
6. How should OECD relate to the many other international organisations, public and pri-
vate, that have now entered the TBDF field?. . . [D]oes OECD have a role to monitor
legal developments, co-ordinate Member countries' responses or offer informed considera-
tion from the perspective of the main data countries?
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B. National Information Management Policies: The
Brazilian Case Study
Brazilian information resources are managed through the Special
Secretariat of Informatics ("SEI"). The SEI formulates Brazil's national
informatics plan, controls foreign information imports through a permit
system, and advises the President of Brazil as part of Brazil's National
Security Council on the impact of the permit system in such a critical
area as balance of payments.
The SEI continues the expanded responsibilities of its predecessor,
Coordinating Commission for Electronic Data Processing Activities
("CAPRE"), to supervise governmental and private sector computer ac-
quisition activities and for controlling the import of computer parts. Im-
ports of computer resources continue to be difficult if the computer tasks
can be obtained in country. For example, imparting a foreign made high
speed data processing computer would be difficult if locally made slower
speed computers could perform the tasks. In many ways, computer and
information resources are managed like foreign investment applications
in many developing countries.
Critics of Brazil's information policies point to localization effects
which may produce higher information processing costs through duplica-
tion of facilities or local content equipment that is less than optimal and
therefore less efficient for operations of companies. They point out, for
example, that Varig, the Brazilian airline, is reported to have been re-
quired to stop using a foreign based computer for airline reservations
control, and to have been required to set up an alternative airline reserva-
tions system in Brazil. Similarly, the British news operator, Reuters, was
requested to establish a local, alternative databank service.
Critics of Brazil's information policies say such increased govern-
mental involvement in information flows like these obviously will mean
7. If OECD is to enter the legal field what institutional methodology will be needed?...
8. Does the methodology of OECD need to be changed if it is to tackle legal questions having
an ethical or expert content?...
9. There have been some who say-just leave it to the common law to develop responses ad
hoc to perceived problems. But they are generally the very people who complain about
uncertainty in the legal positions and who may be most harmed by that uncertainty. Is
there a role for the OECD to pre-empt incompatible national lawmaking by entering the
field of data law and formulating broad principles for the guidance of home governments-
if only on the "rules of the road"?
10. Finally, should we be thinking of lower level legal regulation: guidelines and persuasive
rules of conduct rather than coersive legal rules? At the least would this be an appropriate
start in the long haul to a coherent body of law on TBDF?. (Emphasis supplied).
These questions, and their answers, obviously have a broader institutional application than the
OECD, e.g., in the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics, United Nations Economic, Social and
Cultural Organization etc., and should also be considered in the context of principles for a Model
Code for Transnational Commerce, presented in Part IV of this Perspective.
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increased regulation. Distortion of marketplace competition, unneces-
sary and perhaps harmful disclosure of confidential data will be risks.
Creation of non-tariff barriers to trade resulting in possible foreclosure of
foreign access to Brazilian markets are also possible results. Critics
maintain these policies reflect an incorrect view of information as a natu-
ral resource requiring governmental protection and preservation.
Proponents of Brazil's information policy argue that it is a reason-
able solution to managing balance of payments flows, to developing inter-
nal market capability, and is a legitimate exercise of sovereignty over
information resources. Since compliance with local laws is usually a nec-
essary condition for conducting international business, there is nothing
special in Brazil's regulation of information business through its informa-
tion processing laws.
Regardless of which of these views is more persuasive, it is clear that
Brazil's information management policies will be watched closely for em-
ulation or rejection by other countries developing their own national in-
formation management policies.
C. Privacy As A Continuing Concern in Europe: The Sieglerschmidt
Report and the U.K. Data Protection Bill
On October 12, 1981, the Legal Affairs Committee completed a Sec-
ond Report ("Sieglerschmidt Report") on the Protection of the Rights of
the Individual in the Face of Technical Developments in Data Processing
and submitted it to the European Parliament. The Sieglerschmidt Re-
port updated the First, or Bayerl Report.
In the Sieglerschmidt Report, the Legal Affairs Committee submit-
ted a motion and resolution7° to have the European Parliament consider
"that data transmission in general should be placed on a legal footing
and not be determined merely by technical reasons"71 and give thought
"to investigating the possibility and desirability of expressly incorporat-
ing the right to the protection of personal data as a human right or fun-
damental freedom in the text of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the form of
a sixth protocol."72
The Sieglerschmiat Report focused on Article 100 of the EEC
Treaty and on the question of whether "harmonization of national provi-
sions in the field of data protection [was] necessary for the proper func-
70 Second Report on the Protection of the Rights of the Individual in the Face of Technical
Developments in Data Processing, 1981-1982 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-548)(1981).
71 Id. at 7.
72 Id.
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tioning of the Common Market in the field of data storage, processing,
and transmission."73 Believing that different legal provisions could di-
rectly affect the establishment or functioning of a Common Market, the
Sieglerschmidt Report stated: "Since, with the Council of Europe Con-
vention and the OECD Guidelines, concrete steps have been taken...
toward the adoption and harmonization of data protection law, it is nec-
essary to ask whether Community provisions are still needed."7 4An af-
firmative answer was given for these six reasons:
1. [T]he OECD decisions have no binding force, although they may even-
tually be brought into force in most countries with a highly developed
data-processing industry;...
2. [A]ccession to the international convention of the Council of Europe by
the 21 member countries is optional; furthermore, ratification is likely,
on past evidence, to be a lengthy process;...
3. [T]he Council of Europe Convention represents, admittedly, the most
far-reaching arrangement at [the] international level for instituting or
harmonizing data-protection law in the signatory states, but it falls
short of the European Parliament's ideas to date on the Community
provisions required;...
4. [M]any of the provisions of the European Convention for strengthening
data protections are only optional and permit restrictions by individual
states;...
5. [C]ommunity rules are needed to regulate transborder data flow be-
tween the Member States of the Community and its institutions and
organs, on the one hand, and the rest of the signatories of the European
Convention on the other;...
6. [C]ommunity provisions will ensure a higher level of harmonization.' 5
Computer processing of information on individuals also continues to
receive attention at the State level. The detail of legislation in this area is
quite complex. For example, as of March 15, 1983, a Data Protection
Bill was being considered in the House of Lords in the United Kingdom.
From the House of Lords, the Bill was expected to go to the House of
Commons, where with the Tories' full backing, it was expected to pass
easily. Civil libertarians opposed the Bill and argued that since manual
files were excluded, the Bill did not go far enough. No action was taken
on the Bill until after Mrs. Thatcher's reelection, when the Bill was rein-
troduced in substantially the same form as it existed in March, 1983.
Two points are worth noting about the text of the Bill. First, under
Part II, the Data Protection Registrar can prohibit transfer of personal
data to a country which is not a signatory to the Council of Europe Con-
vention or to a country which is a signatory if the Registrar is satisfied
73 Id. at 31.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 31-32.
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there is an intention to transfer such data to a third country that was not
a party to the Convention. Second, under Part II, the Bill provides for
personal liability of any "director, manager or secretary or similar officer
of the body corporate" where an offense under the Bill was committed by
a body corporate "and is proved to have been committed with the con-
sent or connivance of or to be attributable to any neglect" by such
individual.
The U.K. Data Protection Act took effect on July 12, 1984, but full
implementation and required compliance will take place in phases
through 1987. Phase I will begin after the Home Secretary gives notice
that computer record holders who store or process personal information
on computers have six months within which to register data on individu-
als with Eric Howe, Data Protection Registrar. Notice of the registra-
tion period has not yet been given. Home computers used solely for non-
business use, as well as payroll and accounting data, are exempted from
registration. Specific files will not have to be registered, just the type of
file, the purposes for which the file is maintained, and who holds the
data. After expiration of the six month registration period it will be ille-
gal to hold unregistered data, and Phase II will begin. Phase II will ex-
tend for eighteen months. Individuals who now have a statutory right to
access information in databanks, will then have the right to have that
information corrected if it is erroneous. The Data Registrar will be able
to compel correction if the database collector refuses an individual's re-
quest to make such correction. General guidelines on the Act are ex-
pected to be issued by the end of February 1985.
The effect of technology is an underlying concern of these related
developments. There are also other concerns. A principal concern of the
U.K. Data Protection Act was to enable the United Kingdom to ratify
the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. Without a Data Pro-
tection Act, the transfer of information to the United Kingdom could
have been restricted or prohibited by other European countries who rat-
ify the Convention.
D. International Information Transfers and Postal Telephone and
Telegraph Authorities
International information transfer may have an impact on Postal
Telephone and Telegraph ("PTT") revenues because such transfer fre-
quently involves telecommunications and computer communications.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:1(1984)
Increasing tension between policies of cooperation and competition7 6 (or
in FCC Chairman Mark Fowler's words "cooperative competition")"
can be expected. It is problematic to speculate on how or if information
technology and economics should influence regulation of national and
international information transfers. However, two matters are clear.
First, growth in new information products and services will benefit from
investment in telecommunications.7" Second, there will be increasing
scrutiny of the structure of the telecommunications industry through
which information transfers may occur,79 particularly if proposals are
76 See Remarks of Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, before the
OECD Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy, in Paris, France, at 11
(Dec. 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Fowler Remarks]: "Competition and the free flow of knowledge
and ideas, regardless of their popularity, are cornerstones of the industrialized nations of the free
world." Id. "To some extent all civilization has been built upon the transfer of information from
one person to another from one generation to the next. We must guard against the inclination to
erect artificial barriers to information flows." Id. at 3.
77 Id. at 12.
78 See Monopoly and Competition In The Provision of Telecommunications Services: A Survey
of the Issues 2-5 OECD, ICCP (DSTT/ICCP/82.32):
2. In effect, the growth of the telecommunications industry over the next two decades will lead
to the rapid diffusion of important new technologies: digital switching, optical fibres, satel-
lites, videotex systems and so on. These technologies will progressively integrate with tech-
nologies derived from the computer and electronics industries, providing a unified
infrastructure for information processing and transmission.
3. This will require major investments in the telecommunications network-absorbing nearly
one per cent of the GNP in the OECD area annually-directly stimulating investment,
output growth and innovation in the industries producing telecommunications equipment,
and in the electronics industries more generally. By improving the quality and reducing the
cost of telecommunications, these investments will also have substantial indirect impacts
throughout the economy.
4. Thus, continued improvement of the telecommunications infrastructure will encourage
rapid development of activities heavily reliant on information systems: these include high
technology manufacturing industries and services such as finance, computer services and
the mass media. Expansion in these areas will contribute to the OECD economies' shift
towards sectors with high value-added and considerable growth potential.
5. Further, the availability of new telecommunications technologies may affect the geographi-
cal pattern of economic activity. With distance less of a constraint on the effective transfer
of information, it should become easier to obtain a balanced regional distribution of indus-
try. Equally, improved international telecommunications will accelerate the integration of
the world economy, and further the growth of international trade and investment, particu-
larly in the service industries.
79 See OECD Secretariat, Monopoly and Competition in the Provision of telecommunications
Services: A Survey of the Issues, OECD, ICCP (DSTr/ICCP/82.32) n.26 (Nov. 18, 1982).
Ultimately, decisions with regard to market structures in telecommunications services will de-
pend on the judgments made with respect to a number of underlying issues:
-whether "universal service at a uniform price" is in keeping with goals of equity and social
welfare, or is an economically inefficient way of achieving haphazard income redistributions;
-whether monopoly or (imperfectly competitive) markets provide the greatest stimulus to in-
novation and service diversification;
-whether the telecommunications requirements of national security can be met outside the
monopoly context;
-and, if competition is decided to be desirable, on whether means can be found of reducing the
costs of a transition to more competitive markets.
In part, these judgments will depend on predictions with respect to future developments in technol-
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made to change that structure. 80
ogy. Inevitably, given the uncertain nature of future technologies, these predictions differ. Thus, for
some analysts, the evolution towards Integrated Services Digital Networks ('ISDN") will reinforce
the natural monopoly character of telecommunications, particularly by increasing the economies
arising from centralized planning of the network's growth. For other analysts, the ISDN will have
an exactly opposite effect, expanding even further the scope for service diversification and for over-
lapping private networks-and hence increasing the benefits of a shift towards competition.
However, these judgments will in the final analysis depend on the characteristics of each na-
tional market-its size, structure and diversity; the technical strength and innovativeness of its firms;
the nature and development of its regulatory and political process. Thus, it may be easier, less
costly, and more beneficial, to introduce competition in a large sophisticated and relatively homoge-
nous national market which already has an institutional framework for dealing with multiple carri-
ers, than in smaller countries with a strong tradition of uniformly available, state provided, public
service.
Given this multiplicity of factors, it is likely that the decisions made by the governments of
OECD Member countries with respect to the basic issuse of telecommunications policy will increas-
ingly differ.
80 Competitive concerns are presented clearly in the following material, quoted at length, at 10-
11 in Monopoly and Competition in the Provision of Telecommunication Services: A Survey of the
Issues, a Note by the Secretariat (Nov. 18, 1982) [hereinafter cited as "Secretariat Note"] for discus-
sion at the OECD, ICCP Special Session, held on Dec. 13-15, 1982:
It is important to note that allowing competition in the provision of telecommunications serv-
ices would require a number of substantial-and probably costly-changes in regulatory
structure.
To begin with, if competitive entry is to be allowed only on a selective basis-that is, in certain
markets but not in others, and/or by firms with certain qualifications but not by others-proce-
dures need to be established for defining and implementing the boundaries between competitive
and monopoly markets, for licensing entry applications, and subsequently for monitoring the
performance of licensees.
At the same time, safeguards of the fairness of competition would have to be set up. In effect,
any move towards liberalized provision of telecommunications services will occur in a market
largely occupied by a dominant firm-the established service provider. Furthermore, under
most liberalization proposals, this supplier will retain a monopoly position in certain parts of
the market, including local distribution. Thanks to this inherited position of dominance, com-
bined with continued access to monopoly revenues, the established supplier could gain an unfair
competitive advantage by:
-cross-subsidizing operations in competitive markets with revenues raised in monopoly
markets;
-- denying or unfairly restricting access by competitors to local distribution;
-preventing the use of facilities by firms wishing to provide either pure resale or enhanced
services.
While safeguards against such anti-competitive behavior can be designed, they may involve
substantial costs. Thus, excluding the suppliers of monopoly services from competitive markets
will be costly: both in terms of the expenses incurred in disposing of the established supplier's
assets in the markets being opened to competition; and in efficiency terms, since there may be
important cost and technology complementarities between the monopoly services and those
provided competitively.
Equally, if the providers of monopoly services are allowed to participate in competitive mar-
kets-either directly or through arm's length subsidiaries regulatory supervision will be needed
to ensure financial transparency in the relations between these two markets and to prevent
unfair competition. Given the complexity of cost structures in telecommunications, it may,
despite this supervision, prove extremely difficult to assess whether the established service pro-
vider's prices in competitive markets are "fair".
Finally, competition, even if not distorted by restrictive practices, will only be efficient if the
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Views on telecommunications structure are diverse81 and, in many
areas, will probably remain so. A universal structure is unlikely. For
example, on April 26, 1982, Gabriel Warren presented this view:8 2 "I'm
not saying that Canada should get on the 'unregulation,' 'free market
forces' bandwagon which is sweeping the U.S.A.-the Canadian Com-
munications sector can not afford the same degree of competition nor the
lack of regulation, as is feasible in the U.S.A."
J. Mueller, a consultant, at the OECD, ICCP Special Session On
International Implications of Changing Market Structures In Telecom-
munications Services, provides another example, worth quoting at
length, in "Regulating International Carriers: Some Atlantic Issues",
presented on December 3, 1982. Initially, Mr. Mueller, contrasts the
telecommunications environment in the United States with that in
Europe:
Because it takes at least two national partners to make an international
telecommunications link, it is not enough for one country to move towards
a pro-competitive attitude without an equivalent response from the other
side. At the moment, most PTTs with a direct link to the United States are
empowered with full monopoly rights for that particular country, its enter-
ing and departing traffic. As such, these PTTs have a degree of monopsony
and monopoly power that has no parallel within the United States frame-
work. How the PTTs use that power depends very much on their own
interest and their political environment. As a consequence, the available
spectrum for certain services, facility and service standards, and related en-
gineering questions may be viewed in different ways than is expected by a
new entering United States carrier.
Furthermore, we must note the PTTs seem quite happy to deal with
their sole source suppliers, with which they already have an established re-
lationship. They are just not used to dealing with multiple interconnect
customers, and many of them see this as an additional administrative bur-
den which does not lead, in their eyes, to an improved level of service. As a
matter of fact, one PIT mentioned specifically that it thought the costs of
doing business per given volume would go up with each additional carrier
competing firms are subject to equal handicaps. In a number of OECD countries, the estab-
lished service providers are bound by constraints of their:
-pricing policies.
-grade of service and reliability.
-geographical pattern of activity.
-equipment depreciation policy.
-and access to capital markets.
Under these conditions the established service providers may lose market shares to higher-cost
competitors who "cream-skim", provide a lower grade of service, do not operate in costly low
density markets, or have easier access to finance. Far from promoting an efficient allocation of
resources, competition under these constraints would increase the cost to society of providing
telecommunications service.
81 E.g., whether monopoly or competition is the best structure for telecommunications.
82 Remarks by Gabriel Warren, Towards a Canadian Perspective on International Communica-
tions Issues, before the Canadian Commission for UNESCO Roundtable, at 3 (Apr. 26, 1982).
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with which it would have to negotiate.
83
Mr. Mueller concluded:
The PTTs are much more concerned with the entry of value added net-
works (VANs) and the resale networks than with the additional entry of
IRC (International Record Carriers), since it is these services that are per-
ceived as a threat to the currently practiced telecommunications monopoly
because of their cream-skimming policy (i.e. a concentration on the most
profitable links) which would result in direct losses of revenue to the PTT.
To some extent, these fears can be traded to the earlier authorizations of
such VANs as Graphnet and Telenet. (Both are United States domestic
value added carriers, which were permitted by the FCC to provide interna-
tional services without first having obtained an operation agreement from
foreign PTTs.) The same worry seems to apply to the case of CCI (Consor-
tium Communications International) and Unitel performing international
carriage, for which the FCC has also not required an operational agreement
with PTTs before granting a common carrier license.
To some extent, such VANs may also perform the function of resellers.
This may entail a retail function, for example with respect to bulk offerings
of international transmission capacity, but also an arbitrage function, if
there exists price discrimination between service and user classes, while the
services are the same in every respect.
Pure resale is essentially an arbitrage function. If it works correctly, it
would start with cream-skimming, thereby putting pressure on rates which
are too high, and withdrawing surpluses from rates which are too low, and
can then no longer be subsidized. A classic case is bulk discounts, where
the discount is larger than the bulk cost saving. In this case the reseller
buys at the low bulk rate and resells at rates which are below the prevailing
rates for small volumes.8 4
These quotes indicate that an emerging international consensus on the
rules for cooperative competition in this area is unlikely to arise at any
time in the near future.
E. Industry Perspectives
1. National Association of Manufacturers
In the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM) has identified three areas which it believes will affect United
States companies attempting to conduct business in the new Information
Age. NAM believes that:
1. There is a general community of interest between U.S. companies that
are suppliers and users of telecommunications equipment and interna-
tional information services. This community of interest encourages
83 J. Mueller, Regulating International Carriers: Some Atlantic Issues, presented at the OECD
ICCP Special Session on International Implications of Changing Structures In Telecommunications
Services 2 (Dec. 3, 1982).
84 Id at 3.
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support for the freest possible trade in information products and serv-
ices, while also allowing for relevant national security consideration.
2. Trade in telecommunications equipment is a critical part of the U.S.
effort to maintain its international competitiveness in advanced tech-
nology, but there is much evidence that our competitive position in this
area has seriously worsened.
3. Many foreign governments-in both industrial and developing coun-
tries-are using restrictive measures related to international informa-
tion flows as de facto trade barriers. They are, thereby, creating the
national basis for internationally competitive advanced technology
industries.8 5
NAM's director of International Investment, Stephen Cooney,
concludes:
The development of the world's international information network is at a
crossroads. Specific policy choices must be made to ensure that interna-
tional transmission of information be kept as free as possible, to maximize
world economic growth and trade. Nationalistic policies openly or indi-
rectly designed to protect local providers of equipment or services will be
tempting because of short-term economic payoffs, but may be counter-
productive in two ways: reduced efficiency in the domestic economy and
increased pressure for retaliatory action by trading partners. Such policies
can negate or reduce the cost savings or improved service that companies
may gain from accelerating advances in information technology.
86
Recent surveys also reflect concerns of businesses in the United
States, 7 which also are expressed by groups such as the International
85 National Association of Manufacturers, ENTERPRIsE, Mar. 23, 1983, at 24.
86 Id. at 26.
87 In December 1983, Price Waterhouse published BUSINESS VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN SERvICEs: THE RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF FORTUNE'S DIRECTORY OF SERVICE COMPA-
NIES. Questionnaires were sent to the chief executive officers of 220 Fortune service companies,
defined as those obtaining more than 50% of revenues from sales of services. Responses were re-
ceived from 76 firms. Forty-nine percent of the responses were from banks, twenty-five percent of
the responses were from diversified service companies, with the remaining responses from companies
involved in retailing, transportation, utilities, life insurance and diversified financial services. For-
eign service revenues of responding firms ranged from $25 million to over $5 billion. Though the
Survey's responses were admittedly limited, 64% of the responses indicated foreign barriers to trade
in services were an increasing problem, while 85% of respondents expected future services trade to
increase only moderately. Id. at 3. See, eg., the full page advertisement by International Business
Machines United Kingdom Limited, THE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1983, at p.5: "We are now one of the
leaders in Britain's information technology revolution. . . Information technology is of course an
international business." See also Transborder Data Flows In International Enterprises: Based On
Results Of A Joint BIAC/OECD Survey and Interviews with Firms, OECD DSTI/ICCP/83.23
distributed at the Second OECD Symposium on Transborder Data Flows, in London, England (Dec.
1, 1983), for an analysis of TBDF experiences of 128 firms in 10 countries. The BIAC/OECD
Survey presents in paragraph 158, at 38, and paragraph 167, at 40, an excellent summary of the
interplay between TBDF in an international firm and telecommunications, worth quoting at length:
In sum, a firm's decision to adopt TBDF depends in part on the telecommunications equip-
ment and services which are available to it. Current technology and prices may prevent some
firms from using TBDF at all, for others an acceptable TBDF system can be found, but may not
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Chamber of Commerce.88 Though these concerns are legitimate, they
may be perceived as secondary and self-serving to a primary strategy of
creating captive markets for the information goods and services of
United States companies. 9
be considered optimal. Furthermore, once a system is in place, the firm is vulnerable to changes
in tariffs and policies which may undermine the reasons for having initiated TBDF use. Given
the importance of telecommunications policy in determining whether or not a TBDF applica-
tion is viable, it is not surprising that a great number of complaints and suggestions are voiced
toward telecommunications authorities in this survey. Setting standards, approving equipment,
providing carriage and establishing prices are all prerogative of the telecommunications authori-
ties which have considerable impact on the international firm-an impact which is increasing as
more corporate functions are aided by TBDF. International tensions can develop when firms
from one country face sudden changes imposed by the telecommunications authorities of an-
other. The potential for conflict underlines the importance of strengthening communication
with users in the telecommunications policy process.
As firms become more dependent on TBDF they also become more sensitive to changes in
the conditions and price of telecommunications services. On the one hand, having based their
new information strategies on certain configurations of price, quality, and permitted uses, some
firms may see the advantages of TBDF applications diminish or disappear if those configura-
tions change. On the other hand, change could also make TBDF newly advantageous to a
different set of firms. What is clear is that telecommunications policy is going to have an in-
creasing impact on the behavior of international firms and, therefore, on the development of
world trade and foreign investment. The increasing importance of information flows, and their
growing value to international firms also implies a need for serious attention to questions of
responsibility for TBDF. The potential harm to be caused by inaccurate, late or misleading
information grows larger with each new application.
88 See I.C.C. PERSPECTIVE, supra note 19, at 2:
In today's increasingly complex business environment, information is a key resource in
national and international trade, commerce and industry, essential to the growth and develop-
ment of individual nations and an important element in the stimulation of the world economy.
In an interdependent community of nations, information can play that role only if it flows freely
and can be accessed and exchanged on a worldwide basis. Because of its pervasive nature,
information technology has inevitably raised a wide range of new social, economic and juridical
issues. Questions have arisen as to how the national interest can be maintained in a world in
which information technology is increasingly creating international interdependence-questions
relating to the protection of personal privacy, economic sovereignty, the vulnerability of a com-
puterised society, the migration of employment and decision taking.
Within the international business community... there are serious fears that the applica-
tion of new information technologies may be inhibited by the introduction of unwarranted or
untimely laws or restrictions. Before any form of additional legislation or regulation is contem-
plated, the ICC urges that certain criteria should be applied:
That it be evident that established law or regulatory mechanisms are inadequate or inap-
propriate.
That significant harm be clearly demonstrable, not merely a technical possibility. Regula-
tions should focus on abuse of the information itself and not on the media of transmission.
That only specific problems be addressed and interference with other parts of the informa-
tion sector be minimised. An example of the latter has been the inappropriate inclusion of legal
persons in the data protection laws of several European countries.
That cost/benefit analysis of administration procedures demonstrate that neither unreason-
able direct or indirect cost nor delays will be incurred by business.
That in view of the dynamic state of information technology and the limited experience in
this field, preference be given to voluntary approaches or other means of avoiding the inherent
inflexibility of legal processes.
That regulatory measures be adopted only within an internationally harmonised frame-
work. Due to the transnational character and importance of information flows, it is vital to
reach an international consensus on their role.
Id at 3.
89 See G. Anderla & J. Petrie, The International Data Market Revisited OECD II DSTI/ICCP/
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2. Canadian Business Equipment Manufacturers Association
The Canadian Business Equipment Manufacturers Association
("CBEMA"), expressed its views in a "White Paper"9 that:
1. A flexible policy should be maintained in dealing with international
information flows.
2. International cooperation between developing and developed coun-
tries should be encouraged for technological growth and free infor-
mation flow.
3. The United States should develop a more coordinated position on
information policy and make its views known in the OECD, GATT,
and IBI.
4. Information resources should not be treated as a natural resource.
The equation of hardware independence with national sovereignty by
some countries encourages false reliance on vertical integration and
an unbalanced use of capital.
5. No viable set of precedents on which a reasonably sound legal struc-
ture for controlling information flows can be based exists and no
structure of agencies, lawyers or courts exists to manage such a
system.9t
In a related paper, entitled "Transborder Data Flow: An Industry
Perspective on the Implications for Canadian Public Policy," CBEMA
stated that:
83.25, 27-28 (Dec. 1, 1983), a paper presented at the Second OECD Symposium on Transborder
Data Flows, in London, England:
In reality what we are witnessing is the emergence, under the leadership of the U.S. infor-
mation industry, of powerful integrated service firms, consortia or closely-knit groups of compa-
nies, combining computing power of their own without precedent, unrestricted access to
countless data bases, assured usage of worldwide networks, an expertise unparalleled in variety
and depth, together with unique marketing and managerial abilities.
This new organisational configuration has-so far-no equivalent in either Europe or
Japan. It may well turn out to be superior, in power terms, to the old-fashioned monopolies and
oligopolies.
And if this happens, then the notion and practice of 'captive market' is almost certain to
spill over from the hardware and-telecommunications industries, to the information industry, as
well. (footnotes omitted).
See Address by Sir Donald Maitland, Second OECD Symposium on Transborder Data Flows,
in London, England (Nov. 30, 1983).
This flow of information [into and out of computers along telecommunications links] is
likely to become [a] major element in economic activity generally and will have special signifi-
cance for the information industry itself. It is equally clear that the full benefits of this flow can
be realized only if data can circulate not just within countries but also across international
borders. On the face of it, this would seem to call for a properly developed and internationally
accepted framework within which the information can flow.
Id. at 2.
90 CANADIAN BUSINEss EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER'S AsSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL IN-
FORMATION FLOWS: THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY (June 1982).
91 Id at 13-14.
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1. Free flow of information across national boundaries-constrained only
by requirements to insure individual privacy and national security-is
essential to the health and growth of the Canadian economy. Free data
flows will become increasingly critical for technology transfer.
2. Unrestricted transborder data flows will not lead to a reduction in the
growth of information processing activity in Canada.
3. There is no proof that Canadian sovereignty is being diminished by
large quantities of information being moved and stored outside
Canada.
92
It is important that industry perspectives, such as those of NAM and
CBEMA, continue to be presented, so that they may be taken into ac-
count by policymakers.93 Unless these industry perspectives are consid-
ered by policy makers, businesses will not make the kind of capital
expenditures and investment in research and development required to
produce the new information products and services presented in Figure 1.
Such perspectives are also vital in analyzing the costs and benefits of fol-
lowing or rejecting the Brazilian information policies discussed in Part II
B of this Perspective.
III. INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION TRANSFERS
A. A Trade Issue?
Is international information transfer a trade issue? The answer de-
pends on what kind of information is involved, and to whom the question
is posed. In some instances, the answer is clearly "yes;" in other in-
stances, the answer is clearly "no." In still other instances, it is not possi-
ble for anyone to answer the question honestly, unequivocally, and
convincingly. It is clear, however, that at least the Commission of the
92 CANADIAN BusINEsS EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER'S ASSOCIATION, TRANSBORDER DATA
FLOW: AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADIAN POLICY, at 3 (June
1982).
93 See Robinson, Environment supra note 1, at 2:
To what extent have international corporations reduced their local data processing activi-
ties [including programming and systems development] and transferred them to another coun-
try? If this transfer has occurred, does the trend appear to be continuing or increasing? Or has
the more recent growing awareness of concerns led to a slow down, or even, perhaps, to some
repatriation of these activities, has there been a parallel transfer of some other corporate
functions?
See also Robinson, Legal Questions and Transborder Data Flow, a Presentation to the Swedish and
Norwegian Societies for Computers and Law (Jan. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Robinson, Legal
Questions]:
In short, if state territorial boundaries are technologically irrelevant to the use and storage
of data, how can national laws further national objectives and still avoid the effect of regulating
"electronic" transaction within the territories of other states? It may well be that persons who
"own," process, store, transmit, and use data in international commercial transactions will in-
creasingly be subject to different and perhaps contradictory national laws.
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European Communities has discussed the technology of information
transfer in terms of trade.
On May 25, 1982, the Commission of the European Communities
submitted a document entitled "Towards a European Strategic Pro-
gramme for Research and Development in Information Technologies" to
the Council. This document notes that the "information technology in-
dustry is at present dominated by the U.S.A.;"9 4 that in the information
technology sector "technology is the key to competitiveness;" 95 and, that
"the overall balance of trade for Europe in the information technology
sector is negative."96
As part of its introduction, the Commission makes four points:
1. Concurrently, with the present economic crisis, Europe is suffering
from declining competitiveness in its industry. This has resulted in an
increasing loss of markets and in a consequent rise in unemployment.
Increasing competition from Europe's major industrial competitors is
being experienced even more in the high technology industries which
are key to Europe's future growth.
2. It is urgent to reverse this unfavorable trend. The Commission has
given priority. . . to adapting the whole range of Community policies
to respond to the present situation and to contribute to solutions.
3. Information technologies effect the entire fabric of the economy. Their
rapid application offers the key to increased competitiveness in virtually
all main sectors both in manufacturing industry and in the service
sectors.
4. Not only is information technology a key to competitiveness, but it is
also a major growth sector. The world market for information technol-
ogy products is growing at 10% annually--even in the present reces-
sion. Annual world sales are perhaps 100 billion ECU and 30% of this
market is within Europe.
97
The Commission responded to this situation by proposing that a
long-term strategy to enable "the European industry to attain eventually
a world market share comparable to the relative size of the European
information technology market itself, e.g. 30% of the world market,"9
be created. The strategy would rest on a cooperative level, called "ES-
PRIT," for European Strategic Research Programme in Information
Technology. These following areas were identified for study: (1) Ad-
vanced Microelectronics; (2) Advanced Information Processing;
(3) Software Technology; (4) Office Automation; and (5) Computer Inte-
94 Towards a European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information
Technologies 2 COM(82)287 Final (May 25, 1982).
95 Id at 1.
96 Id at 3.
97 Id at 1.




The Commission put the ESPRIT program in a larger context:
In the U.S.A. 15.7% of the national 1981 R&D budget of $68.6 billion
($10.8) was for electronics and related technologies. Of this figure some
47% was to be provided by industry and 49% by government. Two exam-
ples of joint U.S. government/industry programmes are the VHSIC pro-
gramme-$210 million over 6 years, with an industrial contribution of at
least that amount-and the ICAM programme-to which the U.S. govern-
ment is contributing $100 million over 5 years.10
The ESPRIT document provides details in many areas.101 The
Commission also indicated that the ESPRIT programme "must at least
match comparable efforts in the U.S.A. and Japan."102
According to a recent article, the ESPRIT pilot program is "a $1
billion catch up and confront program for information technology
modeled on [Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry's
("MITI")] successful plans that helped Japanese industry overhaul
American manufacturers of microchips and main frame computers." 103
99 Id. at 6.
100 Id at 11 (footnotes omitted).
101 Id Paragraph 42.1 in the Commission ESPRIT Document illustrates this detail for advance
microelectronics in the area of advanced interconnect for very large scale integration:
A silicon integrated circuit is made from a wafer of pure silicon onto which has been fabricated
by a series of deposition, diffusion and lithographic processes a very large number of micro-
scopic electronic components. These are grouped together by metal interconnections to form
circuits or cells performing specific electrical functions. Within the next five years, it will be
possible to pack one hundred thousand cells or more on a fifty square millimetre VLSI chip
(about the size of a small finger nail), in mass production. In order to achieve this density of
integration the size of any feature of the microcomponents must not be greater than 1 micron
(millionth of a metre) as compared to 3-5 microns in commercial use today. There is at present
no mass production technique that is compatible with one micron feature technology, either for
connecting together the components that constitute a cell or for interconnecting the densely
packed cells. The millions of connections required must be isolated from each other and yet be
as short as possible in order to avoid reducing the speed at which the circuits can operate. In
order to solve this problem it is proposed to develop a technology whereby four very thin insu-
lated layers of metal interconnection patterns with a minimum feature size of 1 micron can be
included in the fabrication process. An additional and vital benefit of this interconnect technol-
ogy is that it will allow the design of interconnections patterns and hence the layout design of
the whole circuit chip to be automated by a computer aided design system. Development of
such a CAD system is the object of another pilot project entitled "High Level CAD for Interac-
tive Layout and Design."
102 Id.
103 Invented in Europe, Patented in America and Made in Japan?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 2, 1983,
at 94.
Another proposed billion dollar program is the Special Programme for Informatics Develop-
ment ("SPINDE") sponsored by the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics. See, ag., Thomas
Ennison, Legal Aspects of TDF In developing Countries-Sovereignty Considerations, a paper
presented at the International Law Symposium on Transborder Data Flow by The Section on Busi-
ness Law's Committee on Computers and Electronic Devices, the International Bar Association, in
Toronto, Canada, at 17 (Oct. 6-7, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Ennison, Sovereignty]:
The programme brings together the suppliers of informatics equipment (defined as the Compa-
nies and their Countries) and financial institutions, on the one hand, and the beneficiary Coun-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:1(1984)
The article indicates that Viscount Etienne Davignon, a Vice President of
the Commission of the European Communities, favors such an MITI
model. It should be noted, however, that at their February 28, 1984
meeting, the EEC's Council of Research Ministers approved the ESPRIT
program, to be funded at 750 million ECUs for the next five years, to be
matched by an equal sum from industry. One ECU equals approxi-
mately $.86.
Furthermore, another article on ESPRIT indicates that ESPRIT
also is being considered as a first step toward a "full-blown European
industrial policy,"' 04 which might include joint product development
and marketing if EEC competition rules are modified. °5 Agreements
between European telecommunications authorities reportedly have been
reached in the area of technical standards for information products and
services "for teletex terminals, which are due to replace telex machines,
and for videotex systems, low-cost computerized information networks
which can carry services like home banking and electronic shopping."'
'0 6
B. Carriage, Content and Trade
Gabriel I. Warren, Director General of International Telecommuni-
cations for Canada's Department of Communications, has stated:
I realize that in a democracy, governments are supposed to deal with "car-
riage" issues and keep their noses out of "content." But it would be naive
to believe that the essential core of Canadian "content" will be able to flour-
ish if the government does not create the financial and cultural conditions
for it to flourish.
10 7
Often, it is difficult to separate content, carriage, and trade issues,
particularly in the area of services. In the area he describes as trans-
border data flow and high technology, Mr. Warren presents a trade
perspective:
The Canadian government will have to come up with positive measures to
stimulate the processing of data in Canada rather than place the emphasis
tries, on the other hand, into a negotiating process to determine the most appropriate means of
establishing the projects needed. Various financing methods are being discussed, among them
Equipment Leasing. This will entail, among other things, an investigation into the Leasing
laws, the general Contract law and tax laws of developing Countries with a view to facilitating
the operation of Leasing Companies.
104 Fin. Times, Mar. 21, 1983, Sec. II, at 2, col. 6. In mid 1984, the European Commission
selected ninety projects and committed 200 million ECU's for funding the initial phase of ESPRIT.
A related EEC program, Research in Advanced Communications in Europe ("RACE") has also
been proposed for approval, to promote research and development between firms in different mem-
ber states, with half of the 500 million ECU funding (approximately $400 million) to be provided by
the Community.
105 Id.
106 Id. at col. 8.
107 Warren Remarks, supra note 78, at 2.
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on cutting off the flows access borders. Similarly, the government isn't go-
ing to build up [the] Canadian communications high tech industry by erect-
ing tariff or non-tariff barriers but by providing incentives for it to grow and
specialize and, very importantly, by aggressively assisting Canadian indus-
try to win foreign contracts.10 8
It is unfortunate but true that incentives such as those suggested by
Mr. Warren may be perceived as non-tariff barriers or impediments to
foreign competition. A case brought under Section 301 of the United
States Trade Act by American Broadcasters (after enactment of a Cana-
dian tax law amendment denying, to Canadian business, a deduction for
the expenses of an advertisement directed primarily to a market in Can-
ada and broadcast by a foreign broadcaster) illustrates this point.10 9
Finally, Mr. Warren states: "I have learned to beware of slogans
such as the type that abound in the international communications field,
ones such as the 'free flow of information,' 'first-come, first-served,' or an
'open skies' satellite policy. There's usually a gut economic interest lurk-
ing beneath the political and even philosophical trappings."' 10 In fact,
Mr. Warren may not have stated the issue strongly enough. In the area
of communications technology, gut economic interests are emerging in
Europe under ESPRIT.
The content of information transfer is not a trade issue. "Truly
democratic governments have a legitimate regulatory role to play in de-
ciding what means of carriage or transmission are used and at what rates.
But it is a cardinal principle of western democracies that government
must not control the content of what is transmitted."'11
As stated earlier, it is impossible to accommodate the United States'
First Amendment values with a trade view of information on content. A
"safe harbor" for such information as news in the stream of communica-
tion must exist regardless of the technology by which it is transferred.' 1 2
108 Id.
109 See infra text accompanying notes 127-131.
110 Warren Remarks, supra note 78, at 3.
11 F. Fox, Communications: Cornerstone of International Relations, address at the Opening
Session of the XIVth Annual Conference of the International Relations Club, University of Mon-
treal 5 (Mar. 16, 1981) (Fox is Canadian Minister of Communications).
112 See THE MEDIA INSTITUTE, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION: A WORKSHOP ON
THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER AND OTHER KEY IssuEs (1981). See also Kirby, The
Morning Star of Informatics Law And The Need For A Greater Sense of Urgency, paper presented
at the Intergovernmental Bureau For Informatics, in Rome, Italy (June 26-29, 1984).
The chief proponents of "free flows" tend to be in the United States of America. Nurtured in
the philosophy of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees
free speech and a free press, Americans tend to be in the vanguard of those urging as little
interference as possible in the free flow of data across borders. It is no disrespect to say that this
doubtless sincere philosophical conviction also happens, providentially, to accord with the eco-
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C. Treaties and Their Application to Trade in Services
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ("FCN") may be
applicable to trade in information services.113 At a program co-sponsored
by the Section of Science and Technology and the Section of Interna-
tional Law and Practice, presented at the American Bar Association's
1982 Annual Meeting, Mark B. Feldman presented the following
analysis:
[T]he FCN treaties entered into by the United States with such states as
France, Germany and Japan generally provide rights of establishment, na-
tional treatment and most-favored nation treatment for most economic ac-
tivities. They also recognize the right to gather information for
dissemination abroad, by the print and electronic media, and they further
provide that nationals of either party shall be permitted within the territory
of the other party "to communicate freely with other persons inside and
outside such territories by mail, telegraph and other means open to general
public use."
If nationals of a treaty party have the right to participate in trade and
commerce on a non-discriminatory basis, and if they have a flat right to use
the means available to the public for domestic and international communi-
cations, there is a clearly implied right to offer computer-based information
and data processing services from inside and outside the host country.
This right to communicate is not to be confused, however, with a right
to operate communications facilities. The U.S. FCN treaties generally in-
clude an exception from national treatment for certain sensitive sectors,
particularly domestic communications. Ironically, an effective right to
communicate under these treaties, that would embrace transborder data
flows, depends on the exclusion of data processing and information services
from the definition of "comunications" even though we are trying to define
"a right to communicate" under international law.
The same distinction, between data processing and telecommunica-
tions, will be necessary to maintain an open international market for com-
puter services outside the scope of the state monopolies that operate
communications services in most foreign countries. Fortunately, this dis-
tinction has been recognized, thus far, by the Federal Communications
Commission, in the consultative bodies of the International Telecommuni-
cations Union, and, to a lesser extent, and perhaps in a tenuous way, by
nomic interests of the United States. Happy is the country whose social philosophy and eco-
nomic interests so neatly coincide.
113 Services are covered, in a limited way, under GATT, in connection with government procure-
ment. See infra text accompanying note 187. See also infra the text accompanying note 113, at 92
(another service sector covered by GATT is cinematograph films). "This is the only service sector
explicitly dealt with in the General Agreement. As provided in Article IV and Article III(10), any
internal quantitative restrictions controlling the use of cinematograph film shall take the form of




Japanese and European regulatory authorities.
1 14
Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that services are not
covered by FCN treaties:"'
With respect to industrialized nations, FCN treaties generally include
both a national treatment clause and a most favored nation (MFN) clause.
Under these provisions, host countries (a) may not discriminate against na-
tionals and companies of other contracting nations and (b) are obliged to
accord treaty partners MFN status in certain areas.
Although many of these treaties make specific mention of financial
services and insurance, they do not purport to cover services in general.
Furthermore, they have often proven ineffective in preventing barriers to
service trade.1
16
The United States National Study on Trade In Services ("SOTIS"),
a submission by the United States Government to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, issued in December 1983, and prepared under
the direction of the Office of the United States Trade Representative,
117
also reviews FCN treaties. According to the SOTIS, the United States is
a party to FCN treaties with 43 nations. More than half of these treaties
were executed since World War II. These bilateral, functional or hori-
zontal agreements differ from post-war FCN treaties. They place
"greater emphasis on the right of establishment and the promotion of
private foreign investment than on trade and shipping." ' In all the
FCN treaties, however, "service industries are treated on the same basis
as other businesses except where more specific provisions are
provided."1 1 9
SOTIS provides a more thorough analysis of these treaties. It notes:
1. The right of establishment differs from treaty to treaty depending on
when the treaty was signed and the economic development level of a
treaty party.
2. FCN treaties executed in the 19th Century do not deal specifically with
investment because foreign investment by U.S. firms at that time was
small.
114 M. Feldman, Remarks at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco,
California 34 (Aug. 10, 1982), reprinted in VI TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. 51, 52 (1983).
115 Fisher & Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for U.S. Exporters of
Goods, Services, and Capital, 14 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 569 (1982).
116 Id. at 640 n.371 (citing R. SHELP, BEYOND INDUSTRIALIZATION: ASCENDENCY OF THE
GLOBAL SERVICE ECONOMY 155-57 (1981)).
117 U.S. National Study On Trade In Services: A Submission by the United States Government
To The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Dec. 1983, Prepared Under the Direction of the
Office of the United States Trade Representative [hereinafter cited as SOTIS]. Canada and the
United Kingdom have also submitted trade in services studies to GATT. Reports from France and
the European Communities are also expected to be submitted.
118 Id. at 75.
119 j'dj
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3. Most favored nation treatment in commercial matters is found in 13
treaties signed before 1905, while 15 treaties executed after World War
I cover most favored nation treatment in establishing and operating a
business.
4. National treatment with respect to establishing and operating a busi-
ness is covered in 11 post-1953 FCN treaties.
5. Exempt from national treatment in all the FCN treaties are activities
involving communications.
6. Some FCN treaties provide special requirements for practicing profes-
sionals (e.g., law, accounting) or [for providing] insurance.120
Thus, SOTIS suggests, there is no universal answer to the question of
whether trade in information services is covered by FCN treaties. The
nature of such service, as well as the specific treaty, would have to be
considered and examined before such a determination is made.
SOTIS also indicates that after execution of the last FCN treaties in
the 1960s, the United States government initiated a new program to con-
clude Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITS").121 BIT negotiations have
occurred with eleven countries, and BITS have been executed with Pan-
ama, Egypt, and Senegal. The model BIT covers "national and most
favored national treatment for investors; standards for compensation in
the event of expropriation; provisions for the transfer of profits and other
funds associated with investments; and procedures for settlement of dis-
putes." 22 Although BITS include service industries, "each BIT contains
an annex in which each party may specify sectors, in which there exist
exceptions from national treatment."'' 2
3
On November 3, 1983, Roland Frazee, Chairman of the Royal Bank
of Canada, gave Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau a proposal for discus-
sions with the United States on trade in computer services. This propo-
sal related to on-going discussions between the Canadian Ministry of
External Affairs and the Office of the United States Trade Representative
for limited sectorial free trade arrangements with the United States.
These sectorial arrangements might be embodied in BITS.
A 1983 publication 124 by Rodney De C. Grey discusses the proposal
for trade in computer services. The Royal Bank of Canada commis-
sioned preparation of this work by Mr. Grey, Canada's former Ambassa-
dor to the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The Traded Computer
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Services report examines the proposal "that an agreement between Can-
ada and the United States setting out rules on access to and for comput-
erized data bank and data processing facilities would be of great value to
users of computer facilities."
125
Utilizing examples similar to those found in the SOTIS report to
distinguish trade and investment, the Traded Computer Services report
proposes a "Right of Presence" in the computer services sector:
In this sector (as in insurance) it may be much more relevant to try to
formulate what could be called a "right of presence" or, perhaps better, to
formulate a parcel of rights which, taken together, would provide assured
access for a data processing firm and a user in one country in regard to the
market or services available in the other. For a computer services company
or a transnational firm (insurance of financial services company) such a
right would involve a "right to deliver" a service and a "right to connect"
with a customer, broker, branch or subsidiary. For certain firms in one
country-those that buy data processing, it would be a "right to receive" a
service from a data processing firm in the other. These balanced rights to
send and receive would, of course, be subject to exceptions which would
have to be either negotiated and stated in explicit terms in the agreement or
made subject to a consultation and amending process.
These rights could also be subject to adherence to standards regarding
access by computer installations to carriers through interconnection facili-
ties and to standards regarding interface characteristics ...
To be fully effective, these various "rights" would have to be safe-
guarded by requirements regarding "most-favoured-nation" and "national"
treatment. This particular parcel of rights, when taken in the context of
national treatment, is clearly the substantive core of a Canada/U.S. bilat-
eral agreement for traded computer services. It should be kept in mind...
that their rights would be vitiated by any requirement that service compa-
nies be locally incorporated; this would bring into play the issue of right of
establishment. 
126
In January 1984, the Office of the United States Trade Representa-
125 Id. at I. See J. Grant, New Financial Services and Transborder Data Flows, Paper presented
at the Second OECD Symposium on Transborder Data, in London, England 11 (Dec. 1, 1983) "We
believe that an open-ended bilateral arrangement between the two North American neighbors is a
realistic stepping stone towards multilateral consensus-a start towards writing 'rules of the road'
which allow us to maintain the flow of information across borders, without endangering legitimate
national interests."
126 TRADED COMPUTER SERVICES, supra note 120, at 10. The report presents the view that right
of establishment "cannot profitably be addressed in any general negotiation about traded services."
Id. at 9. Narrowly defining right of establishment as "a right incorporated in an international agree-
ment for corporations in one country to incorporate a subsidiary in the other," the report finds "no
such provision in the GATT nor in the various OECD codes. The GATT deals with the treatment
of goods, and the OECD, in this context, addresses only the issue of 'national treatment' for entities
once they are established." For regulated industries such as banking, insurance, and telecommunica-
tions, the report finds the concept of right of establishment conditioned or restricted, with any exten-
sion of a broader right of establishment "bound to be controversial." ia
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tive sent a letter to private industry explaining these proposals, present-
ing a background paper on U.S.-Canadian trade in telecommunications,
and posing eight questions for telecommunications equipment industries
and six questions for service industry on potential bilateral negotiations
with Canada.
If implemented, these proposals would result in special trade agree-
ments involving specific industry, product, and service sectors. This
would continue the deemphasis on FCN treaties. It is increasingly likely
that sectorial BITS will be proposed involving both telecommunications
equipment and computers. These proposals will raise difficult issues. As
the Traded Computer Services report states:
[P]erhaps the only acceptable form, of a Canada/U.S. bilateral would be an
open-ended arrangement, in order that other countries can join on similar
terms. It will be necessary to examine the extent to which U.S. and Cana-
dian obligations under our existing agreements, which frequently use un-
conditional most favoured nation clauses, would raise difficulties. This
could occur if the U.S. were to agree, for example, to treat Canadian com--
puter service transactions in a manner which it is not prepared to treat such
transactions with some other country unless that country signed a similar
undertaking, if it then appeared that there is some general M.F.N. clause
which could be held to be operative. It will be necessary to look at the
International Telecommunications Union agreements, the OECD Code on
Invisible Transactions and at a number of FCN treaties, to see what may be
involved. 127
D. Policy Issues: A Delicate Balance
If there is one outstanding, sphinx-like question in the area of inter-
national information transfer, it is this: How do you balance issues in-
volving information transfer, computers, communications, technology,
economics, trade, and industrial policy? The answer: very delicately,
and not in a Code. There are no natural fits, nationally or globally, only
emerging perceptions as to the form these complex and related issues
may take when combined.
Even these perceptions will differ depending on: (1) how close one's
eye is to one of the issues while attempting to keep the others at least
within peripheral view; (2) the time frame used; (3) the country one is in;
and (4) the political and economic value system one embraces.
An examination of trade issues in relation to GATT and Section 301
of the United States Trade Act of 1974 illustrates this point. GATT does
not yet apply to services generally, 128 or to information services categori-
127 Id at 12.
128 Cf supra note 109; infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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cally. The revision of Section 301 of the Trade Act, however, "includes
but is not limited to services associated with international trade, whether
or not such services are related to specific products."
129
As the Senate Report on the 1979 Amendments to Section 301
states: "[The Section] is practically speaking, the only avenue of relief
open to American service industries in our emerging information econ-
omy which encounter foreign government actions that discriminate
against or otherwise import [sic] their international interests." 130
An excellent article by Bart S. Fisher and Ralph G. Steinhardt
111,131 discusses the application of Section 301 to services. While stating
that Section 301 "is the legal armor for U.S. citizens seeking to do battle
in the world marketplace,"' 132 the authors nevertheless state it would be
inappropriate "to convert Section 301 into a protectionist statute to as-
sure substantially equivalent competitive opportunities for U.S. Com-
merce in foreign markets." 133 The article covers Section 301 in detail
and discusses the Border Broadcasters case.1 34 A brief summary of that
coverage illustrates some of the issues that would have to be considered
in a TBDF Model Code for Transnational Commerce.
In September 1976, Canadian Section 3 of Bill C-58 was enacted.
For both commercial and cultural reasons, the bill denied a deduction to
Canadian taxpayers for expenses of advertising carried on a United
States border broadcast station but directed at a Canadian audience.
About ten percent of Canadian television advertising expenses or $20
million allegedly were being spent on such cross border advertising.
United States broadcasters argued in their Brief that Section 3 of Bill C-
58 was unreasonable because it resulted in a confiscatory duty and be-
cause it did not reciprocate United States treatment of Canadian
broadcasters.
Canadian broadcasters argued the Bill imposed a cultural tax that
fell outside the United States Trade Act, and that broadcasting, as a reg-
ulated industry, fell outside Section 301. President Carter, after receiving
the recommendations of the Section 301 Committee and USTR Ambas-
sador Askew in July 1980, asked for "mirror legislation" to be enacted in
Congress to reflect Section 3 of Bill C-58. Congress did not act, however,
129 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(1) (1982).
130 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG & AD.
NEws 381, 391.
131 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 115.
132 Id. at 571.
133 Id. at 572-73.
134 let
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because it was recessed. The Fisher-Steinhardt article draws six conclu-
sions from the Border Broadcasters case. Two conclusions are:
1. [T]he. . .case demonstrated the limitations of the Section 301 process
for service-related petitioners. The Executive branch, under both Re-
publican and Democratic administrations, refused to push for a tough,
goods-related remedy. Fearing that Canada might have taken the
United States to GATT under an Article XXIII nullification and im-
pairment theory, President Carter refused to impose limitations on the
imports of Canada's film, record, and television industries. The case
demonstrated that restraints on foreign goods will have to be considered
as an adjunct to restraints to U.S. services which will frequently have
little impact on the offending country ...
2. [T]he case vividly demonstrated the limitations of remedies keyed to
legislative action. When the designated remedy is passage of legisla-
tion, the matter effectively passes from the executive branch to Con-
gress. At that point, the petitioners must start again to develop a
constituency in support of legislation. "Tax, cultural, trade and com-
munication perspectives can all be found in the Border Broadcasters
case. Matters giving rise to the dispute remain unresolved, and the
kind of remedy, if any, which may be appropriate remains illusive." 135
This discussion of Section 3 of Bill C-58 illustrates the problems that
may arise from only one piece of legislation, in one country, in the area of
tax deductibility of business advertising expenditures. The effects of Sec-
tion 3 were considered to be unreasonable because they created a barrier
to United States trade in broadcast advertising services.
The Computer Group within the Office of the United States Trade
Representative has compiled a 228 page printout, however, listing eleven
categories of selected impediments to trade in services in 140 countries,
regions, communities, or continents. Service categories included are: in-
surance, banking, building construction and engineering, hotel and
motel, motion pictures, accounting, advertising, franchising, transporta-
tion, leasing, telecommunications, data processing, and information
services.
This list of categories raises three questions: (1) Can the concept of
balance apply across so wide a range of activities? (2) How do the lessons
of the Border Broadcasters case, involving both Section 301 and GATT
concerns, apply to these other service categories? (3) If "free flow" does
not extend to commercials, should a TBDF Model Code for Transna-
tional Commerce exclude "broadcasting"?
135 Id. at 650.
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IV. A MODEL CODE FOR TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCE
A. Need or Basis?
There is no current need 136 or basis137 in the area of transborder
data flow for a Model Code for Transnational Commerce. Such a code is
likely to be proposed 138 and developed in the future. It will have to con-
front a forbidding array of difficult issues. This code may be referred to
as the "MCTC."
The MCTC will raise many of the same issues that drafting any code
136 There is no current need for a MCTC because code alternatives being explored, such as the
bilateral arrangements suggested in the Traded Computer Services proposal, supra note 120, or mul-
tilateral arrangements such as reviewed in the SOTIS report, supra note 113, have not yet had time
to succeed or fail. These alternatives may prove better than a code approach to the trade and eco-
nomic issues addressed in this Perspective.
137 In a letter, Professor Louis B. Sohn of the University of Georgia School of Law offered the
author the following observations on the MCTC twenty principles:
You are making a good case for devising a code on the subject, or at least for getting ready
for one when there should be more clamor for it. It is a lawyer's duty to anticipate problems
rather than merely react to them. Consequently, the kind of thinking your paper represents is
important. Of course, this is just the first step. The next one would be, I suppose, to explore the
options, the various ways of approaching the problems and the alternative solutions that are
available. It is always better to have your partners in the negotiation to think with you through
the various steps than to present them with conclusions. However excellent they may be, the
other negotiators are likely to look at them very suspiciously and will be worried that the pro-
posals are biased in your favor. But if you present them with several options, in most cases,
after thorough discussion of advantages and disadvantages of each of them, they are likely to
choose the one that you would have preferred if the choice were left to you. Regardless of
national and educational biases, lawyers think alike and are going to find some solutions more
reasonable or more feasible than others.
I hope, therefore, that after this excellent beginning you will explore the principles for the
code or the guidelines with an open mind, presenting several alternative solutions for each issue
rather than trying to arrive at this early stage at the ideal or final solution.
Letter from Louis B. Sohn to Ronald Wellington Brown (Oct. 3, 1983) (available at Northwestern
Journal of International Law & Business).
Alternative solutions to the MCTC principles would include, among other solutions, no code, as
well as bilateral or multilateral arrangements covering specific sectors, e.g., computers, telecommu-
nications, communication services, or all sectors. Though a detailed discussion of these alternatives
or the multiplicity of alternatives for each of the twenty principles is beyond the scope of this Per-
spective, some alternatives are covered in the SOTIS report, supra note 113.
See also Robinson, Legal Questions, supra note 89, at 1:
[Il]t is perhaps too early to think in terms of a cohesive legal framework for dealing with the
issues. Instead, it may be more productive to identify, and then to define as clearly as possible, a
few specific legal questions of interest to a number of OECD member countries. In addition, it
may be necessary, if there are close links to ideology, to aovid some of the more sensitive issues,
such as national sovereignty at this stage.
138 See infra text accompany note 155. The same trends are present in the area of international
information transfers. See also Clariana, The Legal Framework of Internatonal Data Flows Inter-
governmental Bureau for Informatics,-TDF 206, 1984, at 40 (".. . [A] declaration of principles
would be more appropriate than a code, because it provides greater flexibility and adaptability to
technological change; wheras a Code of Conduct would offer the advantage of making it possible to
envisage disciplining the conduct of commercial agents, including transnationals. Perhaps this prob-
lem can be solved by imagining a hybrid solution: a declaration of principles on a code of conduct
for international data flows.").
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of conduct entails. The questions raised include: (1) Should the MCTC
be voluntary or binding?; (2) Should it extend to all TBF activities re-
gardless of the nature of the enterprise which engages in those activities?;
(3) How, if at all, should choice of law, choice of forum, and dispute
resolution be addressed?
Each of these questions is complex and has a wide range of possible
answers. A few of the possible answers for dispute resolution are out-
lined in the article "Techniques for Settlement of Transactional Disputes
Involving Transfer of Technology." They include:
1. international arbitration;
2. settlement by negotiation among the primary parties with the assistance
of third parties through such techniques as mediation, conciliation,
consultation or advisory arbitration;
3. creation of an administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial organization
with supranational competence to enforce the international agreement;
4. establishment of an international organization to serve in a rulemaking
and advisory capacity with national implementation and enforcement,
and
5. where appropriate, resort to existing institutions and regional organiza-
tions. . . which provide forums, facilities and procedures for dispute
settlement. 139
Although adoption of the fifth suggestion would be preferable, other
choices might be reasonable.
In addition to dispute resolution, a MCTC would have to address
other issues. What role, if any, should notice, and consultation play?
Should the MCTC attempt to state general principles or provide detailed
regulations and rules? Should it attempt to be comprehensive, covering
matters as diverse as privacy and commercial activity, or should it be
limited? Many of these issues are common to all codes of conduct.
Therefore, it would be appropriate to make a few further comments on
such codes.
B. A Closer Look at Specific Codes and Codes in General
Neither national nor international law provides a definition for
"code of conduct." A code, of course, may propose new laws, compile
old laws, state general principles, or elaborately present rules and
regulations.
Codes abound. American lawyers are familiar with the Uniform
Commercial Code, with its variations, as adopted by all states except
Louisiana, and with the Code of Federal Regulations," 4° the proposed
139 14 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 264, 269 (1979).
140 I C.F.R. § 1.1 (1984). The Code of Federal Regulations is a codification of the general and
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Federal Securities Code, 141 and the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. 142 Lawyers from a civil law tradition are familiar with codes ranging
from the Code Civil' 43 and the Code of Obligations'" to such regional
arrangements as the Andean Investment Code. 145  Other codes of note
include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (which
though voluntary have code-like expectations),' 46 the proposed Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 47 and the Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations.148 A diminution over time in the number of
codes with which lawyers, and their business clients, must be familiar is
not likely.
The history of one of these codes, the United International Code on
the Transfer of Technology, illustrates how difficult it may be for a
MCTC to obtain consensus support. In "The UNCTAD International
Code on the Transfer of Technology: Current Status,"' 49 Sigmund
Timberg recognizes the "overriding political, social, and economic pres-
sures inevitable in the case of negotiators who represent national view-
points""'  which underly some disagreements between the industrial
countries (OECD Group), developing countries (Group of 77), and so-
cialist countries in Technology Transfer Code negotiations. Mr. Timberg
concludes that the gap between the OECD and Group of 77 views as to
choice of law and forum is as a practical matter unbridgeable and
presents the following summary of positions:
The Group of 77 has taken the position that the law of the country
acquiring the technology should apply to all matters relating to public pol-
permanent rules published in the Federal Register by the Executive department and agencies of the
federal government.
141 A.L.I., FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (1980).
142 See, eg., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1980).
143 The French Civil Code is one example. See DE VRIES AND DAVID, THE FRENCH LEGAL
SYSTEM (1958).
144 The Swiss Code of Obligations is one example. See C. SZLADITS, GUIDE TO FOREIGN LEGAL
MATERIALS (1959).
145 Andean Common Market Foreign Investment Code, Decision 24: Common Regime of Treat-
ment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties (as amended), Dec. 31,
1970, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 126 (1972) (translation by U.S. State Department).
146 OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, discussed in
OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: REVIEW OF THE
1976 DECLARATION AND DECISIONS (1979).
147 U.N. Conference on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology (Nov.
16, 1979), U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/20 (1979).
148 United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations: Draft U.N. Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.l0/1982/6 Annex (June 5, 1982).
149 Timberg, The UNCTAD International Code on the Transfer of Technology: Current Status, 11
INT'L Bus. LAW. 61 (1983).
150 Id. at 61.
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icy (order public) and national sovereignty. Also, they propose that the
courts and other tribunals of the technology-acquiring country should have
jurisdiction over such matters, as well as over conflicts on how to character-
ize the dispute. Otherwise, the parties to the dispute are free to choose the
forum or resort to arbitration, unless the acquiring country has rules to the
contrary and provided the chosen forum has a direct, effective and perma-
nent relationship with the contract.
15 1
On the other hand, the basic view of the OECD countries is that the
parties should be free to choose the applicable law, provided it has a sub-
stantial relationship to the parties or the transaction or there is another
reasonable basis for the parties' choice. They should also be free to choose
the forum before which disputes will be tried, unless there is no reasonable
basis for the choice made or the choice places an onerous burden on one of
the parties. Also, the OECD Group is strongly in favor of arbitration
procedures. 1
52
A MCTC would likely face the same kind of difficult disagreements.
Even if a MCTC were to be voluntary, it could have a significant
impact on states and the development of customary international law,
both public and private. Joel Davidow, writing on "The UNCITAL Re-
strictive Business Practice Code," provides an example of how this might
occur:
It seems clear that the proposed UN transfer of technology code of
conduct, for instance, would, if promulgated, have certain model law impli-
cations, that is, it is likely that countries with no law on the subject might
well enact legislation based on the code or insist, administratively that tech-
nology transfers to their country be in accordance with the structures of the
code. 153
A voluntary MCTC might follow this pattern. Thus, even if a MCTC
was proposed only as a guideline for the future, it should concern inter-
national lawyers.
In his Remarks in the Proceedings,'5 4 Professor Louis Sohn at-
tempted to apply the views of Judge Sorensen (European Court of
Human Rights) that "we have three types of international lawyers, those
looking at the past, those interested in the present, and those thinking
about the future."' 5  Professor Sohn noted that "The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights was first adopted as a guideline for the future, but
quickly was changed into law generally accepted by states."' 5 6 Professor
151 Id. at 63.
152 Id.
153 13 INT'L LAW. 587 (1979). For a recent review of codes, see Wallace, International Codes
and Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Update and Selected Issues, 17 INT'L LAw. 435
(1983).
154 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 33.
155 Id. at 195.




In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights we went through two
stages. First, it was said that this will be the law of the future, and we don't
know how soon the future might come, but it will be the law someday. But
then very quickly, the United States itself. . . applied the Declaration to
the case of Russian wives and a few months later the Soviet Union was
willing to apply the Declaration to South Africa. Of course, you may say it
is always easier to apply it to somebody else, but still once you agree that
this document is supposed to be binding on somebody else, you implicitly
admit it should be binding on you, too. Everybody knows a basic rule of
international law is that it is a two-way street. It is reciprocal. What binds
one binds also the other.
15 7
This past experience indicates how quickly a guideline for the future may
be changed into law generally accepted by states.
If a MCTC were to be binding rather than voluntary, its principles
might be incorporated into a convention requiring signatory states to
conform national laws to those principles. If the content of information
is considered in such principles, this would make it impossible for demo-
cratic governments with first amendment type values to become signato-
ries to the convention.
Perhaps the most penetrating analysis of codes of conduct can be
found in Raymond J. Waldmann's book Regulating International Busi-
ness Through Codes of Conduct.58 He found that the following four
trends have had the greatest effect on the development of codes of
conduct:
1. the increasingly important role of governments in economic affairs;
2. the increasing politicization of governmental economic policies;
3. the increasing concern for the impact of international economic policies
on development in the less developed countries; and
4. the increasing awareness of the concern for secondary effects of interna-
tional economic policies and activities.
1 59
Waldmann examines the Andean Investment Code, the OECD Code for
Multinational Enterprises, the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences,
the Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, and the Code of
Conduct for Transnational Corporations before offering several tentative
conclusions about codes of conduct. Two of those conclusions merit
reflection.
First, he concludes, "codes of conduct will be increasingly used in
the international community to deal with problems which countries are
157 Id.
158 Waldmarn, Regulating InternationalBusiness Through Codes of Conduct, AMERICAN ENTER.
INST. FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH (1980).
159 Id. at 11.
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unable to solve on a national level."' 161 Second, he states, these codes
"will not be applied consistently, uniformly or vigorously even if they are
negotiated successfully, and we may see the development of parallel sys-
tems of law, with international codes serving as rhetorical and moral
standards, but with national laws and regulations continuing to reflect
the realities of money and power."' 161 If problems created by transborder
data flow by definition or in practice cannot be solved at the national
level, Waldmann's first conclusion suggests a code of conduct may be
used to deal with such problems. The OECD Guidelines on TBDF may
be the genesis of such a code should the guidelines fail to achieve their
objectives. The proposed Council of Europe Convention must also be
considered. Economic aspects of TBDF may lead to the kind of bifurca-
tion suggested by Waldmann's second conclusion. Together these two
conclusions suggest direction and movement for TBDF, but not neces-
sarily progress or change.
C. Information Flows and Business: Considerations for a MCTC
Classical economists told us that three things are important to run a com-
pany: money, materials, and manpower. Later technology and information
were added to the list .... 162
Information has been moving across borders for centuries, with
bards, caravans and explorers, by word of mouth, and by manuscript.
Technological advances have made such movement more rapid and more
important in business transactions.
Eric J. Novotny, in his article "Transborder Data Flow Regulation:
Technical Issues of Legal Concern"' 163 has classified several types of
modern business information flows presented in Figure 5. Novotny de-
scribes a Type 1 consolidation flow as a simple subsidiary-parent report-
ing relationship. A Type 2 distribution flow describes subsidiaries
receiving data from a centralized entity. Type 3 transnational network
flow involves transnational processing, for example, by a service bureau.
Type 4 multinational network flow describes multiple user and host com-
puter interactions where information and processing are centralized,
160 id. at 85.
161 Id. at 86.
162 Hiroaki Kosaka, Director of Overseas Training Center Matsushita Electric Industrial Com-
pany, HARV. Bus. SCH. BULL. 75 (Feb. 1983).




TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS CAN BE GROUPED
INTO FOUR TYPES
COUNTRY A: BORDER COUNTRY B:
TYPE 1: CONSOLIDATION FLOW I
____________________ ~ ~~ ~~I___________ ______________
164 Novotny, Transborder Data Flow Regulation: Technical Issues of Legal Concern, 3 CoM-
PUTER L.J. 105, 111 (1982), reprinted with permission.
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distributed, or both. 165 The national laws of country A and country B
may regulate the compilation, storage, transmissions and processing of
data differently and entail different compliance requirements. Novotny
observes that in general "regulatory conditions, and hence technical con-
cerns are influenced greatly by the direction of transmission, the geo-
graphic location of computation and storage functions, and most
importantly the location of the user." 166
Novotny's analysis of types of transborder data flows is useful in
considering several important problems with which a MCTC would be
faced. First, uniform legal compliance with a MCTC may not be possi-
ble given the different types of data flows to be considered. Different
types of flows may require different legal treatment. Second, the type of
flow may be difficult to identify when transmissions are digitized and
consist of voice, data, and record transmissions in the same channel con-
templated as part of the Integrated Services Digital Network. "Tagging"
transmissions by type, even if technically possible, may entail unaccept-
able "passport", "information license" or "transmission surveillance"
procedures. Third, entities sending or receiving data or providing the
equipment (and perhaps the software) needed to do so may have substan-
tially different interests and needs. A MCTC attempting to cover and
apply to everyone may be satisfactory to no one.
As central processor to central processor computing increases, it
will become increasingly impossible to identify a single geographic loca-
tion, i.e., State "A" or State "B," as the sites of the computer; the com-
puter itself will span geographic boundaries. This technological
development will make it harder to accommodate policy choices of sov-
ereign restrictions or free transfer in different states in which the comput-
ing function is occurring. Conflicts of jurisdication or concurrent
jurisdiction are likely to exist for information transfers in such a multi-
state computer.
The present Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States declares in Section 39 that a state with jurisdiction is
not precluded from exercising it solely because that exercise would re-
quire a person to violate the laws of a different state having concurrent
165 Id. at 112.
166 Id. It may become increasingly difficult, if not impossible to identify computer functions geo-
graphically. See e.g., Butler, Data Transmission and Content Responsibilities Must be Separated, VII
TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. 269 (1984). When we have high data-flow rate, central processor-to-cen-
tral processor communications, it will no longer be possible to consider the physical installations at a
given geographical location as the computer. We will have moved from computer-to-computer com-
munications to a situation where the whole, including the telecommunication facilities, will make up
the device that is doing the work.
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jurisdiction. The Restatement suggests, in Section 40, five factors which
should be considered in balancing the interests of conflicting jurisdiction.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists, that Section states "each state is
required by international law to consider in good faith, moderating the
exercise of its jurisdiction" in the light of (1) the states vital national
interest; (2) extent and nature of hardship that would be imposed by in-
consistent enforcement; (3) extent to which required conduct takes place
in the territory of the other state; (4) nationality; and (5) extent to which
enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to
achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by the state.
This balancing of interests approach to conflicts of jurisdiction
should be used when different legal rules apply to international informa-
tion transfers, such as those which might occur between a Council of
Europe member state like the United Kingdom and a non-member state
like the United States. It should also be used in multi-state transfers such
as those represented in Figure 5. A balancing of interests approach can
accommodate legitimate state interests while giving an appropriate flexi-
bility essential for adapting to ever continuing changes in computer tech-
nology. Such flexibility also would be in accord with business interests,
such as those identified by CBEMA in Part II E 2 of this Perspective.
However, whether other countries would view the Restatement (Second)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States as useful or an acceptable
approach for international law governing conflicts of jurisdiction and in-
ternational information transfers is by no means certain.
D. MCTC: What Norms and What Role For International Lawyers
In discussing elements of a MCTC, which may be a binding code in
the form of a convention, we should be aware that we are engaging in a
codification process which in itself may create norms. Judge Sorenson, in
his paper, "Theory and Reality In International Law" '16 7 notes that in
theory "international law is a system of binding norms, but in reality
effective compliance with the law is low, at any rate in matters affecting
important national interests, and the substantive content of many norms
is controversial." '168 Continuing, he asks and, in part, comments on two
difficult questions:
How do we distinguish law from other social norms? Law as a system of
norms does not hold a monopoly on regulation, either in national societies
or in the international field. There are other norms, whatever names we
apply to them-moral precepts, comity, codes of good behavior, profes-
167 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 33.
168 Id. at 141.
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sional standards of conduct, rules of the game, etc.-which influence
human action, and one of the perennial problems of jurisprudence and legal
philosophy is precisely to determine the dividing line between legal and
nonlegal norms. In whichever capacity we approach legal problems-be it
as observers, actors or reformers-the question inevitably arises: by what
criteria do we recognize a social norm as legal, that is as having the particu-
lar qualities which warrant its classification as a legal norm?1
6 1
Thus, we are faced with the question of what kind of norms should a
MCTC incorporate?
In discussing a MCTC, we also may be starting the process of
engaging in the legislative role of international lawyers. Professor
Schachter, in his article "The Invisible College or International Law-
yers"'170 makes this memorable observation:
[I]nternational lawyers, both individually and as a group, play a role in the
process of creating new law and in extending existing law to meet emerging
needs. This legislative role is carried out principally through multilateral
treaties, but it may also be accomplished through the evolution of custom-
ary law, the use of general principles and the formative effect of resolutions
of international bodies ... .
A threshold issue is whether international lawyers as a group have the
professional competence to consider the need for a new or revised law on
matters which are of a non-legal character-political, economic, technolog-
ical and so on. It is in fact widely believed that questions of that kind are
more appropriately within the competence of other social sciences ...
Plausible as this point may seem, it suffers from a major defect-the social
scientists do not, as a rule, address themselves in any detail to the need for
new law or to the kind of analysis that is relevant to the legislative
need. . . . [I]n fields such as outer space, the sea-bed and the environment,
the international lawyers, far more than any other disciplinary group,
played a central role in constructing normative and regulatory schemes
where little had existed previously. 172
We are just beginning to fulfill a legislative function in the area of inter-
national information transfers.
It is clear that international lawyers have just as important a legisla-
tive role to play in international information transfers as they have
played in the areas of outer space and the sea. Each area has initially
been viewed as a frontier, requiring careful consideration of old norms,
policies and laws before recommending those which could serve a useful
function in developing the new area. Identifying normative and regula-
tory schemes will be equally as complex and challenging for international
information transfers. Against that backdrop, and before accepting the
169 id at 142.
170 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 217 (1977).
171 Id. at 223.
172 Id. at 224.
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challenge, we might reflect on the words of Professor Myres S. McDou-
gal in the Proceedings:
173
I think in recent decades we have seen an almost complete disintegra-
tion of the law of the sea. There was worked out, by a few simple rules, a
way of enjoying a great shareable resource where everybody who had the
technologies, the initiative, the skills could contribute to the greater produc-
tivity and wider distribution of goods and services. Under the guise of the
common heritage of mankind, which has been made a complete mockery,
there has been an enormous increase in the monopolization of the oceans of
the world. It somehow defies the imagination how this slogan has been
used to extend coastal state control until the shareable resource is almost
gone.
We did establish a very good law of outer space on the model of the old
law of the sea, the law of the sea that prevailed for some 200 years. I am
beginning to hear murmurs of the common heritage of mankind in the law
of outer space. I suspect that we will go through the same struggle on these
immense new resources as on the law of the sea.
The proposed new international economic order deals with much more
than economics. It is really a challenge to the whole inherited global con-
stitutive process. It is an attempt to resurrect domestic jurisdiction and to
put many decisions under national control that for a long time have been
under international control.. If the interdependences of the globe continue
to accelerate the way they have during the last few decades, this new enter-
prise is a hopeless enterprise. Its proponents are just sticking their fingers
in the dike while the water is pouring over the top.
The new international information order is cut from the same cloth. It
is an effort to put under the control of the officials of nation-states the flow
of information across nation-state lines. If knowledge, skill, and under-
standing are in fact becoming more important bases of power in the con-
temporary world, as people begin to enjoy their new realism, I think this
second effort to promote domestic jurisdiction is also utopian. Its propo-
nents won't get very far, but they will cause many of us a lot of work to
demonstrate their irrationality. There is no way in which states can unilat-
erally control the contemporary technology for gathering, processing, and
disseminating information. 74
E. MCTC and the OECD TBDF Guidelines
A MCTC might address many of the topics covered in the OECD
TBDF Guidelines, but might take a markedly different approach with
respect to economic aspects of data flows. 175 The eight principles of na-
tional application in Part Two of the Guidelines, the "equivalent protec-
tion"' 7 6 language of legitimate restrictions in the Basic Principles of
173 Supra note 33.
174 Id. at 200.
175 See infra App. II for a basic summary of the Guidelines.
176 Id.
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International Application, and the recognition in the Explanatory Mem-
orandum of "the rights of Member countries to regulate transborder
flows. . . in areas relating to free trade, tariffs, employment, and related
economic conditions . ... 177 all might serve as foundations for a re-
strictive approach to a MCTC.
F. MCTC: Twenty Principles
In the preceding portions of this Perspective, I have attempted to
present some considerations and describe some difficult issues applicable
to a MCTC. For purposes of preliminary discussion and thought, this
section presents twenty principles for a MCTC. These twenty principles
should be viewed as suggested fundamental principles to be used at the
beginning of the legislative role described by Professor Schacter rather
than as ultimate principles in which such a process may culminate.
The first five principles deal with non-duplication, specificity,
norms, intent, and diversity. A MCTC should:
1. Take account of existing laws, regulations, rules, Guidelines, Conven-
tions, and Proposals (e.g., Vredeling, OECD Declaration on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises, etc.), and neither
duplicate nor compound requirements pertaining to information
transfers.
2. Deal with specific problems not already addressed (e.g., by the ITU,
WIPO etc.).
3. Recite the norms on which it is based and restrict its application to
realization of those norms, in fora, and through means and procedures
currently used or recognized in international law.
4. Include an Unofficial Commentary or Guide to assist in understanding
the drafters' intent.
5. Reflect recognition that there are many different kinds of information
flows, that there are different data flow interests and needs of States,
legal and natural persons, and that harmonization of all may be
impractical.
The next eight principles have been taken from the so-called Bing
Report. Jon Bing, Peter Forsberg, and Eric Nygaard prepared a draft
report in 1981 entitled "Legal Issues Related to Transborder Data
Flows."' 78 Appendix II of that Report is entitled "Tenative Outline of
Principles for the Free Transnational Flow of Non-Personal Data" and
contains, for discussion only, the following eight principles:
6. Free flow of data principle-Member countries should take all reason-
177 See also Comment, Transborder Data Flow: Problems with the Council of Europe Convention,
or Protecting States from Protectionism, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 601 (1982).
178 OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Working Party on Information,
Computer and Communications Policy, DSTI/ICCP/81.9.
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able and appropriate steps to ensure that trausborder flows of non-
personal data are not made subject to obstacles exceeding the require-
ments of national policy.
7. Best term principle-Providers of computer services in member coun-
tries should not be made subject to unjustified discrimination. Na-
tional authorities should grant a provider of such services equal terms
with those granted that foreign provider benefiting from the most
favorable terms for the equal type of computer services. Exceptions
may be made when the most favorable terms are integrated in a bi-
and multilateral agreement on trade cooperation.
8. Expedient transit principle-If transnational data flows must be com-
municated across the territory of a third country, national authorities
in the transit country should undertake to facilitate this flow. The
flow should not be delayed for non-communication reasons and
should be given priority in respect to network capacity or other tech-
nical reasons. If breakdown or malfunction in the telecommunication
facility in the transit country or in the subsequent segments of the
network make intermediary storage necessary, this storage should not
bring the data under the law of the transit country. Exceptions to the
obligations in this article may be made in respect to transnational data
flows in conflict with national sovereignty, national security and pub-
lic order (ordre public).
9. Tax and custom free transit principle- Transnational data flows
should not be subject to taxes or customs in the transit country.
10. Access to services principle-Persons or organizations of one country
should be free to use computer services offered by the providers in
other member countries. Restrictions should be limited to those based
on interests recognized by international law.
11. Confidentiality of communication principle- National authorities
should not routinely sample or supervise the contents of transnational
data flows.
12. Technical quality principle-National authorities should maintain the
necessary technical quality in the telecommunication network to se-
cure efficient access to international computer services.
13. Technical harmonization principle-Member countries should work
towards achieving compatible technical standards in their telecommu-
nication networks to facilitate the efficient access to international com-
puter services. 17
9
Six more principles may be added to the thirteen principles listed
above. Mark B. Feldman, in his paper "Commercial Speech, TDF and
the Right to Communicate Under International Law,"1 0 mentions these
six principles as interests which "need to be accommodated in any mean-
ingful international regime for transborder data flows." '18 1 They include:
14. The right to establish and to operate data processing, information and
179 Id at 88-9.
180 VI TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. 51 (1983).
181 Id
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other computer services within states and across international
boundaries;
15. The right of access to foreign data bases and data processing facilities,
and to international communications links at reasonable rates and
without discrimination;
16. The diffusion of new technologies on reasonable commercial terms;
17. The recognition of proprietary interests in new forms of intellectual
property and technology such as computer software and satellite
signals;
18. The protection of personal privacy; and
19. The interests of all states in national security, economic development
and the public health and safety.1 82
Feldman indicates that to be broadly acceptable, these interests
would "have to reflect a balance of rights and responsibilities," would
"have to allow sovereign states a measure of discretion in the implemen-
tation of the regime" and "must represent a broad mutuality of economic
interests."' 3 These goals cannot be easily achieved.
The twentieth principle for a MCTC comes from a statement by
Professor Myres S. McDougal in the Proceedings. A MCTC should rec-
ognize that:
20. [T]he most important law in any community is not constitution-mak-
ing, not in legislation. It is customary law. Customary law is created
by the flow of agreements, and the International Court of Justice deci-
sions, but it is also created by all kinds of communications, even from
individual human beings who have no explicit authoritative role. It is
this total flow of communication that creates the expectations about
authority and control that transcend the boundaries of national
states .... 184
Professor McDougal also states that a MCTC should recognize that:
[T]he genuine sanction of any law must be in peoples' perception of their
common interest, in their perception that they have more to gain and less to
lose by following policies of peaceful cooperation and of shared enjoyment
of the great shareable resources of the globe and earth/space
community. 185
V. TBDF AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES: A SQUARE PEG AND ROUND
HOLES FOR A MCTC
This section of the Perspective will briefly cover and comment on
several existing or new legal principles and areas as well as their possible
application to transborder data flows. A broad overview is intended
182 Id.
183 Id. at 52.
184 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 33, at 199.
185 Id. at 201.
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rather than a substantive detailed analysis. (In particular, this caveat
should be kept in mind for the discussion on the Common Heritage of
Mankind; a complex and difficult concept to apply as a legal principle.)
None of these principles may be accurately applied to TBDF.
A. Incoterms for Information?
It may be that some TBDF problems may be resolved through crea-
tion of and use of "Incoterms for Information." Professor Bing has sug-
gested Incoterms may be an approach to TBDF legal principles; a kind
of "Incoterms for Information Transfers."1 6 Incoterms 1953, and their
revision in 1980, represented an attempt by The International Chamber
of Commerce to overcome the problems of conflicting national laws, and
interpretations, by establishing a standard set of trade terms and defini-
tions, which offered neutral rules and practices. Though the present list
of Incoterms is limited to fourteen, that list has received increased inter-
national use in commercial contracts. Incoterms were drawn from the
most common practice in international trade so that they could be
adopted by the greatest possible number of traders. The present absence
of common practices in international information transfers may be the
most significant barrier to development of Incoterms for information.
The OECD Guidelines,"8 7 Council of Europe Convention,18 8 and existing
national laws in Europe,18 9 however, may prove to be a useful start in
overcoming this obstacle.
B. GATT: Should Information Be A "Product" or "Service"?
The question of whether information should be a "product" or "ser-
vice" for purposes of GAIT is receiving increased attention by govern-
ment policy makers and business executives. William Brock, United
States Trade Representative, takes the view that we need international
rules to govern information exchanges:
When the first international trade organization was suggested, it was
supposed to include all exchanges. They couldn't bite that political bullet
in those years, so they limited it to just the exchange of goods. Two-thirds
of the American people work in services today. It used to be that most
people worked in farming. Then those people worked in manufacturing.
Now most people work in services. It's that kind of a world. It's got to be
that kind of a world. But there is no international regime, none at all, to
govern the exchange of services .... There are no rules governing the
186 See supra note 173, at 68.
187 See infra App. II.
188 See supra note 172.
189 See Hondius, Data Law In Europe, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 87 (1980).
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exchange of investment, to control the distortion, again created by govern-
ments intervening in investment decisions.
One of the greatest problems I see coming is in the area of the ex-
change of ideas. We're beginning to hear now of governments which are
seriously discussing taxing the exchange of information, and even beginning
to say, "We're going to tax the transmission of bytes up to satellites and
back down to another country." How do we value that information? It's
an interesting legal question and an interesting ethical question, too.
We simply do not have any rules internationally to govern the conduct by
which we communicate, relate, and exchange with one another, things
outside of the realm of things that you can see, taste, and touch. That has
to change .... 190
The problem remains how to develop these rules and implement these
changes.
Harry Freeman, a Senior Vice President of American Express be-
lieves the solution to the problem is to bring international information
products and services into GATT.
[T]he international flow of commercial data is moving rapidly from
being a communications issue to becoming a trade issue. As such, it should
be subject to international trade negotiations and a system of internation-
ally agreed trade rules. Let me hasten to add, before there can be any nego-
tiation, there must be much preparatory work both at the national and
international levels. But the work should begin now. And that work
should begin with the GATT.19 1
At present there is no forum in which to raise and resolve problems en-
countered by international providers of information services. In Free-
man's view GATT is an existing forum with well-known rules and
procedures that could implement the change he and William Brock think
is necessary. A forum is better than no forum. But, is GATT the place
to go with these problems?
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a code
containing tariff concessions, rules on international trade and resolutions
of disputes. It was originally signed at Geneva in 1947 by the United
190 Brock, Global Competition-What Impact on US. Industry?, 52 ANT'rrRusr L.J. 147, 153
(1983).
191 Freeman, Impeding the Flow of Information Damages the National Interest, VI TRANSNAT'L
DATA REP. 19 (1983). Joan Edelman Spero, Sr. Vice Pres., International Corporate Affairs, Ameri-
can Express, expressed the following views regarding establishment of a TBDF in a letter to the
author dated Oct. 18, 1983:
In my view, one can set about building a TBDF regime in two main ways: by establishing
principles which will, as you point out, be difficult to enforce, or by grafting some elements of a
regime onto existing regimes such as the trade regime. Both approaches have serious problems.
Agreeing on principles such as the twenty you suggest is quite difficult....
GATT can't enforce all trade rules but it does serve as a set of rules and guidelines which
can be enforced albeit ineffectively and which, perhaps more importantly, serve as a check on
protectionist pressures within states. As for your argument that if you include TBDF you
should include all services I would respond: But of course!
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States and twenty-two other countries. Since January 1, 1981, the Gov-
ernment Procurement Code negotiated during the 1979 Tokyo Round of
GATT negotiations, has applied to international government procure-
ment by countries which are parties to the Code, or which file instru-
ments of accession to it. A procurement for services per se is not subject
to the Government Procurement Code of the 1979 Tokyo Round of Mul-
tilateral Trade Negotiations. If services are incidental to a supply con-
tract for products and have a value of less than the supplied products,
however, then the Code will apply to the service procurement. "At an
early stage," the "possibilities of expanding the coverage of the Agree-
ment to include service contracts," e.g., insurance, are to be explored.192
Do governments procure information products or services? Should "in-
formation" be a "product" or "service" for GATT purposes? Is Harry
Freeman correct?
193
Several problems would be created if GATT were expanded to in-
clude information products and services. First, Art Dunkle, GATT's Di-
rector General, has stated GATT "cannot be a world trade court.
Conciliation is our priority; it's not our job to determine who's right and
wrong." 194 Expanding GATT to include information product or service
disputes may inappropriately stretch existing resources and be a step to-
ward, rather than away, from such a world court type role.195 Second,
and perhaps contradictorily, less than one-fourth of world trade is cov-
ered by GATT. According to an April 13, 1982 article "The First Trade
Lesson," 196 approximately one-fourth of all trade in goods is conducted
by barter, one-fourth involves internal transactions of multinational en-
terprises, and another fourth is subject to quotas of orderly marketing
arrangements. Do we know enough about trade in information goods
and services to decide if inclusion in GATT is better than exclusion?
Third, if information trade is an invisible, like insurance, tourism, ship-
ping, and capital transactions, why should GATT be given an influential
role over information invisibles but not other invisibles?
The 308 page SOTIS prepared under the direction of the Office of
the United States Trade Representative, discusses GATT and services.
192 Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 11, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/211/Rev. 1, re-
printed in AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGo-
TIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Part IX, I 6(b) (1983). See also Brown, The
New International Government Procurement Code Under GA7T, 53 N.Y. ST. BJ. 198 (1981).
193 VI TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. 19 (1983).
194 THE ECONOMIsT, Apr. 24, 1983, at 93.
195 Though the SOTIS report, supra note 113, argues for such an extension, it does not suggest a
court role for GATT.
196 THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 1982, at 16.
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The SOTIS is divided into five sections: (1) services in the world econ-
omy; (2) services in the United States economy; (3) conceptual issues
related to trade in services; (4) existing international services; under-
standings; and (5) possible approaches for establishing a services regime.
The last three sections develop an early SOTIS theme that "a simple
blanket extension of the GATT to services is not possible."' 19 7
Section 3 of the SOTIS covers, among other generic issues, distinc-
tions between trade in services and investment in services and posits the
utility of continuing the traditional separation of investment and trade
issues, in the area of services. For example, the SOTIS characterizes the
provision by a foreign computer center of data processing services
through long distance communications links as trade but characterizes
locally provided data processing services by a foreign owned computer
processing facility as investment. In addition, SOTIS characterizes ac-
cess to a distribution system as a trade issue but ownership of that system
as an investment issue1 98 and concludes that in such a case, a national
treatment principle under GATT could be applied to trade in services by
including the "right of a foreign supplier of services to negotiate a con-
tract with local business to provide distribution or servicing facilities." 199
The foreign supplier of service might be a foreign insurance carrier con-
tracting with "local insurance brokers or claims adjusters to sell their
products and to handle claims." 2' SOTIS states:
[I]f the national treatment principle were adopted for trade in services, a
domestic regulation requiring legal establishment for insurance companies
should be treated in the same way as any other domestic regulation. In
other words, foreign insurance companies granted access to the local mar-
ket under trade rules, would have a right to establish themselves legally
under the national treatment principal. 20 1
Finally, in the area of professional services, e.g., engineering practice, the
SOTIS characterizes the sale of such services "produced outside the im-
porting country" as a trade issue, but does not characterize the sale of
such services "to be provided locally" 2 2 the same way. The distinction
between trade and investment needs to be carefully examined in each
context in which it has been raised and applied. It is not clear, in the
area of professional services, how trade and investment differ. In the
practice of law, for example, the conceptual distinction may make no
197 See SOTIS report, supra note 113, at 5.
198 Id. at 71.
199 Id.
200 Id




sense or have no real application given different national conceptions of
"practice" and "lawyer."2 3
While observing that extending GATT to services "makes very little
practical sense,"2 4 the SOTIS report concludes that "many of the princi-
ples (and procedures) embodied in the GATT could be relevant to serv-
ices."20 5  Among these principles are national treatment,20 6  least
restrictive regulation,20 7 nondiscrimination,2 "8 transparency, 2°9 and dis-
pute settlement.210 Some of these principles are found in the model code
principles presented in Part IV F of this Perspective.
An expansion of GATT to include information products and serv-
ices would not result in the quick resolution of disputes2 1 involving such
products and services. Dispute resolution under Article XXII of GATT
merely requires consultation between contracting parties. Because states
are the contracting parties under GATT, a provider of information prod-
ucts and services would have to first convince its governmental represent-
atives to raise the matter in GATT, even before consultation would
begin. It is likely that only major disputes, involving significant informa-
tion industries, would surmount this initial obstacle. Further, under
GATT dispute resolution procedures, consultation between contracting
states and parties is followed by third party state conciliation efforts. If
these efforts are unsuccessful, a panel will review the dispute and make
recommendations to the GATT council. These are slow procedures, fre-
203 See Note, Providing Legal Services in Foreign Countries: Making Room for the American At-
torney, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1767 (1983).
204 See SOTIS report, supra note 113, at 89.
205 Id
206 Id at 90.
207 Id at 104.
208 id at 105.
209 Id, at 106.
210 Id. at 107.
211 See Farnsworth, William Brock- Our Men for Trade, N.Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 13, 1983,
at 131, col. 1:
World trade negotiations move with the speed of a frozen snail. All trade negotiations are
conducted through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI), the 36-year-old
world-trading charter that now has 89 member nations. But there is no majority voting in this
organization. It operates by consensus, meaning that any nation can block negotiations. Years
elapse between the start and conclusion of negotiations because governments first have to bal-
ance competing domestic interests before they can even attempt to work out a balance of mutual
advantages with other governments. Another reason for the long delays is that bureaucracies in
all capitals move slowly. The Kennedy Round began in 1963, ended in 1967. The Tokyo
Round was conceived as the Kennedy Round ended, but it was another half-dozen years before
it got formally underway. It wasn't concluded until 1979.
For a discussion of GATT dispute resolution procedures before and after the Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and time limits created for such resolutions see de Kieffer, GA7T
Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in International and U.S. Trade Law, 2 Nw. J. I-r'L L. &
Bus. 317 (1980).
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quently involving important economic issues, whose resolution may have
significant political dimensions.212 A thorough review of the speed, pro-
cess, and result of GATT procedures is a prerequisite to considering
whether expanding GATT to include information products and services
will significantly enhance the ability of providers of information products
and services to overcome barriers to this form of trade. Some examples
of problems encountered by one firm are presented in Appendix III for
consideration in this context.
C. Uniform Commercial Code: Information "Goods"?
People have bought and sold information for centuries. But assigning a
price to it is no easy task. Unlike oil, baseball bats and widgets, there is a
limitless supply of information, and copies are cheap .... Information
that is worth a lot today, like a tip about which horse will win the third race
at Aqueduct, is valueless tomorrow.213
Information is a commodity for some purposes,214 because people
trade in it, and not for others. If information is classified as a commodity
and if commodities are "goods," one might think that Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") might contain some principles ap-
plicable to TBDF.215 Why? First, because that article applies to "trans-
actions in goods;" '216 second, because Section 2-105 defines goods, in
part, as "all things which are movable at the time of identification of the
contract. . .;,1217 and third, because of Section 1-105. Section 1-105 of
the UCC, states "when a transaction bears a reasonable relation" 218 to a
state enacting the Code and also to another state or nation, parties may
agree to apply the dCde, or the law of such other state or nation to gov-
ern their rights and duties. "Failing such agreement," the Code "applies
212 See U.S. Faulted by GATT On Nicaraguan Sugar, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1984, at D, col. 1:
"[The United State's representative ... indicated to the [GATr] council that a settlement of the
sugar issue would have to wait on an improvement in the political relations between the two
countries."
213 Sanger, Waging A Trade War Over Data, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1983, § 3, at 26F.
214 See A.D.L. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 9, at 7: "For some Western countries, information
may soon be the only commodity they can produce with a advantage in international trade; it will be
the foundation of their information economies"; MAKING A BUSINESS OF INFORMATION: A SURVEY
oF NEW OPPORTUNmEs, a 1983 Report by the Information Technology Advisory Panel, to Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher. "Both private and public sectors in the United Kingdom need to pay
much more attention to information as a commercial commodity .... " Id. at 8. "We look to a
further shift to an awareness of information as a commercial commodity in the next few years as we
truly enter the Information Age." Id. at 47. "Copyright legislation is fundamental to the commer-
cial viability of the tradeable information sector." Id. at 8.
215 U.C.C. § 2 (1978).
216 Id. § 2-102.
217 Id. § 2-105.
218 ICL § 1-105.
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to transactions bearing an appropriate relation ' 219 to the state enacting
the Code.
It would be inappropriate to attempt to extract TBDF legal princi-
ples from the UCC. Section 1-102 of the Code states the underlying pur-
poses and policies of the Code are to: (1) simplify, clarify, and modernize
the law governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement
of the parties; (3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions. These purposes and policies do not fit the current state of TBDF
developments. In addition, too many non-commercial aspects of TBDF
would fall outside a UCC model for TBDF legal principles.220
D. Bills of Lading for Information?
If information is a commodity and commodities are goods, then in
addition to the UCC's provisions covering bills of lading (a document
evidencing receipt of goods for shipment), we would probably also have
to examine the Federal Bills of Lading Act,221 the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act,222 to name a few applicable laws. However, a bill of lading is:
(1) a receipt; (2) a contract of shipment; and (3) a document of title.
Thus, it is not clear a bill of lading will serve TBDF legal principle needs.
Could an information bill of lading be accepted as a substitute for infor-
mation itself?
E. Innocent Transit?
The principle of innocent transit in GATT223 and the Universal Pos-
tal Convention, may not survive being transplanted into TBDF. There is
an underlying, but frequently inarticulated premise in TBDF regulation:
that some information (as recognized by the ITU Convention224) is not
"innocent."
F. Is Information the Common Heritage of Mankind?
"The Common Heritage of Mankind" ("CHM") is a concept that
can be found in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies225 (the "Moon Treaty"), in the
219 Id
220 See supra text accompanying notes 17-92.
221 49 U.S.C. §§ 20(11)-(12), (81)-(124) (1982).
222 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1982).
223 See SOTIS report, supra note 113.
224 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
225 See infra note 224.
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea22 6 and elsewhere.2 27
Broadly, the CHM concept, in part, reflects a belief that all nations
should share in an identified resource, even if, in the case of the moon,
some nations lack the technological means to access and exploit that re-
source. At some point a studied attempt probably will be made to apply
the CHM concept to information, broadly defined, as a natural
resource.
22 8
In an excellent article, "The Common Heritage of Mankind Provi-
sion in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
226 See infra note 230.
227 See infra note 228. See also Clariana, Framework, supra note 134, at 29.
It should not be forgotten that whereas spare activities carried out by persons subject to the
jurisdiction of a State are themselves subject to the law of that State, States as such are subject
to International Space Law which makes them responsible for insuring that space is used for the
benefit of mankind and for peaceful purposes, inter alia. This applies to data flows as to any
other activity.
228 See, eg., Declaration of Buenos Aires on Transborder Data Flow, VII TRANSNAT'L DATA
REP. 265 (1984). Several Latin American countries and members of the Intergovernmental Bureau
for Informatics agreed "to encourage all international actions and policies on harmonization leading
to consider informatics as Mankind's Heritage. .. ." See A.D.L. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 9, at
7. "These conflicting views of information as the common heritage of mankind, on the one hand,
and as intellectual property or a produced commodity, on the other hand, give rise to very different
perspectives on, and suggested very different regulations for, the international flow of information."
Though not raised in the context of Common Heritage of Mankind or extractive industries, the
Commission of the European Communities' Country Report, "Some Views on Transborder Data
Flows and Information Market Policy," presented by C. Jansen Van Rosendaal, at the Second
OECD Symposium on Transborder Data Flow, contains language suggesting information is a re-
source. "In terms of the economies of Western Europe, information is one of its few renewable raw
materials, with the information and information technology industries as one of its few sunrise sec-
torS." Id. at 2. However, this Country Report also presents a larger perspective on transborder data
flows. "The European Commission. .. recognizes the far-reaching implications of transborder data
flows for all countries, and for the European Community in particular, bearing in mind that in order
to achieve. . . benefits, the ultimate aim is to integrate these flows as far as possible into national
and international contexts." Id. See, eg., INTERGOVERNMENTAL BUREAU OF INFORMATICS, IS-
SUES ON TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW POLICIES 2.2.3, at 7:
Information and knowledge have become products of national economies which are in transition
from industrial to information based, service economies. This is also the case in many develop-
ing countries which are moving from agricultural and industrializing economies into informa-
tion economies. Therefore, information and knowledge are resources, having commercial value
and may be looked upon in much the same way as tangible goods. There are important property
rights and ownership controls which may be placed on information and knowledge, just as is
done for physical materials.
See, eg., INTERGOVERNMENTAL BUREAU FOR INFORMATICS, ISSUES ON TRANSBORDER DATA
FLOW POLICIES 2.1, at 3:
Data transmission networks serve a wide variety of governmental, economic and social func-
tions and may be technically designed quite differently. However, the technologies involved are
usually integrated with each other in term of data capture (input terminals, document readers,
sensors), data storage (electromagnetic, filing cabinets, microfilm), data processing (computing
installations, text processing systems, home computer attachments, microprocessors), data
transfer (broadband communications, telephones, TV connections, space stations, optical fibers)
and data distribution (printers, TV screens, accoustical telephone outlets). Combinations of
these technologies are bringing videotelephones, teletext, TV-text and cabletext.
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Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, '229 Professor Carl Q. Christol summa-
rizes five notable CHM characteristics. With slight modification, some
of these characteristics, specifically the fourth and fifth, arguably could
be extended, however inappropriately, to information as a natural re-
source. It is worth quoting Professor Christol at length:
The CHM legal principle has its most immediate and prospective ap-
plication in the area of the exploration and use, including exploitation, of
natural resources. Intangible natural resources include the broadcast spec-
tra, orbital positions, and scientific information. Tangible resources include
moon rocks and other minerals and materials situated on the moon or other
celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the earth.
The CHM principle has notable characteristics. First, it is an enlarge-
ment of the traditional international legal principle of res communis;
thereby rejecting the res nullius perspective. As such, it is just the opposite
of the exclusive private property-public sovereignty principle respecting
natural resources in their natural condition, e.g., prior to permissible cap-
ture, or use, and exploitation. Second, the principle seeks to benefit man-
kind generally by protecting the physical environment against unnecessary
degradation. Third, it endeavors to conserve the world's resources for pres-
ent and future generations. Fourth, it seeks through agreement to achieve
the goal of equitable allocation of such resources and benefits with particu-
lar attention to the needs of the less-developed countries. This is the es-
sence of the res communis humanitatus concept. Fifth, it contemplates the
presence or formation of an international regime containing such rules as
may be necessary to insure the realization of the previously identified objec-
tives. If it were to become apparent that a formal governing structure were
required to provide for a normal and structured utilization of the spatial
area and its resources, including, for example, processes for the resolution
of disputes, it may be anticipated that the legal regime would lead to the
establishment of a suitable international intergovernmental governing body.
It must be borne in mind that the C-M principle is the product of a
world-wide awareness of the fact that natural resources are being rapidly
depleted. When the natural distribution of resources was made by nature,
not all states and peoples received an equal share of such resources. Thus,
there are substantial political and economic forces at work in support of the
distributive aspects of the CHM principle. Realism must also take into ac-
count the fact that scientific and technological competences are not equally
shared among states, that military capabilities are very disparate, that there
are wide ranges in the respective capacities of states to regulate their own
affairs, and that the demands of some of the less-developed states for a
larger sharing in the world's resources and benefits are abrasively strident.
Further, it has been perceived that all human beings are members of
the human race no matter whether they live in the "North" or the "South,"
whether their loyalties are given to technologically advanced or disadvanta-
geous states, and whether their ideologies support the cause of freedom or
statism. Many of the advanced states, for example, have cooperated to
229 14 THE INT'L LAW. 429 (1980).
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ameliorate the pressing burdens of poverty in the LDC's, through what is
known as development assistance. This has its foundations in moral con-
cerns, since the history of mankind has been based on the proposition that
the rich and powerful possess a moral obligation to aid those less favorably
endowed. The sense of sharing has come to be considered as a precurser of
a global fairness revolution. The CHM principle has been influenced by
such considerations.230
Whatever else may be said for the CHM principle, the concept
would be difficult to apply to information as a natural resource. It would
be illogical and impracticable to attempt to extend a concept such as
sovereignty, which has been applied to extraction of mineral resources, to
information. Information is not a natural resource.
If "natural" means from nature, then obviously information literally
is not natural. If natural means "prior to permissible capture, or use and
exploitation," the concept becomes even more ephemeral or metaphysi-
cal when applied to information. In addition, information unlike a natu-
ral resource, is not capable of being "depleted;" rather, it grows through
the merger of computers and telecommunications. Further, although
there is a "north/south," "have/have not" dimension to the information
industry,2 31 the developing countries may have an interest in free flow of
information2 32 which transcends a possible interest in changing the dis-
230 Id. at 451-452.
231 See Ennison, Sovereignty, supra note 99, at 2:
At present, virtually all of the on-line market is limited to the developed market economies and
their institutions, be it in terms of the production of on-line data bases, their operation, distribu-
tion or use. The vast majority of the developing countries have neither the financial nor the
technological means to compete in this market. Hence, once again the developing Countries are
cast in their familiar if not traditional role in the international economy of participating in this
hi-tech market primarily as suppliers of data and consumers of the finished product of processed
information as and when they can afford to purchase such information, which is not very often.
The flow of data is therefore set in a constant stream, flowing from South to North, and this sets
the stage for the various shades of attitudes and concerns of developing Countries regarding
TDF.
See also Butler, The ITUs Role In World Telecom Development and Information Transfer, TELEPH-
ONY, Aug. 22, 1983, at 80:
Individual governments and several international organizations have turned their attention to
awesome adjustment problems posed by computer communication, and to the issue of trans-
border data flow. Of the 117 developing countries which represent 70% of the world's inhabit-
ants, only 5% have access to computers. Yet, capacity to transfer information by appropriate
means is vital to the national development of their countries. On the other hand, data commu-
nications sustains an unusually high growth rate that has converted it into a dynamic sector of
the international economy. Despite the large annual growth rate of data transmission, data still
represents only 3% of the public telecommunications traffic. In comparison, telephony ac-
counts for about 95% of world telecommunications traffic.
232 See Ennison, Sovereignty, supra note 99, at 16, for presentation of views on why developing
countries may have other strong interests in free flow of information:
In these circumstances, the developing Countries of Africa, after an honest assessment of the
nature of modern information flows, and its trend towards exponential growth, responded to its
challenges by coming to terms with the realities of a situation over which they could do very
little, politically, and nothing, technologically. By their Abidjan Recommendation of Novem-
ber, 1979, therefore, they affirmed their commitment to the principles of free flows of informa-
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tribution patterns of that industry through claims of information
sovereignty. 23
3
tion, and in consonance with standard practice, linked this commitment to the furtherance of
the New International Economic Order, but in full recognition of the fact that Permanent Sov-
ereignty, the moving spirit of this Order has no place in Transborder Data and Information
flows. Besides, they have a vested interest in making a reality of their active support for free
flows of information in order to gain access to a number of items of information for various
important decisions such as (a) application of attribution rules for the purposes of determining
tax liability of foreign companies; (b) determination of prices of primary products; and
(c) prevention of the harmful effects of transfer pricing. And above all, Africa needs informa-
tion about her natural resources, especially her mineral wealth.
233 Id. at 10:
The question then arises as to what is the relationship between the concept of permanent sover-
eignty and the information relating to. . .material resources, within the context of the present
conditions of data capture, processing and transmission, all of which are processes over which
developing Countries especially have no control or means of control.
Explaining the concept of Permanent Sovereignty for extractive industries, Ennison asks if Perma-
nent Sovereignty has any place in transborder data flows. "[T"he State's ownership attaches to the
resource and is traced to the extracted minerals in the hands of the foreign corporation even after
contract purporting to give exclusive rights of appropriation. Anything that derogates from this is
an impairment of the permanent sovereignty of the State." Id at 13. His analysis and answer, at 14-
15, are worth quoting at length:
A straight application of the Permanent Sovereignty concept to data and information flows
would mean, for instance, that Sovereignty attaches to the data and information on the mineral
wealth and other natural resources existing in data bases of foreign companies and located in
foreign Countries. But the impossibility of exercising any effective power of supreme ownership
in respect of information in these data bases shows that Permanent Sovereignty is effective only
when there is physical possession, and thus can not treat information in the same manner as it
treats the substantive natural resources such as the gold or oil over which the State has physical
possession. Let us, for instance, consider the case of data which relates to mineral deposits
which in developing countries are invariably owned by the State and over which the state exer-
cises permanent sovereignty. Suppose then that, in the course of exploration operations for oil,
cores of hydrocarbon bearing rocks are cut from boreholes and with other seismic data are sent
to home-based computers for processing as is usually done by oil companies. Can permanent
sovereignty be claimed over such information? Or should it be claimed? And if not, why not?
And what about access to such information? Should it be granted as of right and free of charge?
Attempts to answer these questions bring us into the arena of the on-going legal and political
discussions in this field. In the first place, although there is no doubt as to the right of States
over their natural resources, there is no indication, according to a UN Study of this subject, that
this right provides legal justification for a claim to sovereignty of exclusive rights to knowledge
or information or data about the resources. If the information were to be physically carried out
of the [C]ountry, it could presumably be said that the [C]ompanies could be prevented from
doing so by Customs Authorities. But the situation is already out of hand, for technological
advancement in this field, especially in satellite communications, allows instantaneous transfer
from the mining operations and real time processing by means of subsystems specially designed
for this operation and carried by the satellite transponders. And then there is the supreme case
of remote earth sensing by satellite located in outer space which is not subject to the exercise of
any Sovereignty, permanent or otherwise. Thus, information technology in this case is racing
far ahead of any Third World concept of ownership of Sovereignty. In other words, TDF has
struck at the very roots of the permanent sovereignty or permanent ownership concept, and any
effort at its exercise in these circumstances is meaningless, for modem flows of data aided by
telematics know no limitations of time and State boundaries. Thus, the combined influence of
communications and computer technology has transformed the traditional views about sover-
eignty which have hitherto been understood and expressed in geographic or spatial terms to a
new kind of perception of sovereignty which for the time being is defined as Informational
Sovereignty.
For a different but related concept of informational sovreignty, see P. Onstead, Presentation of
the Association for Data Processing Service Organizations, at the Second OECD Symposium on
Transborder Data Flows, in London, England 4 (Dec. 1, 1893). "Many nations, including the
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In general, the CHM concept is difficult to apply absent some notion
of the legal principles assumed to be implicit in the term. What legal
rights or duties are covered? To whom do those rights and duties extend,
and how broadly or narrowly should they be construed? Is the CHM
concept fixed or flexible? Does it extend to the present and future physi-
cal environment of human beings or does it extend beyond the physical,
e.g., air, water, earth, sun, etc., to the cultural environment represented
by arts, artifacts, and historical sites? Specifically, if applied to informa-
tion, broadly defined, would the CHM concept extend to information
content (ideas and knowledge, etc.), information process (how content is
gathered, stored, transmitted, etc.), or information format (display)? If
information comes to be treated as CHM, what would be the effect on
such areas of the law as copyright, trade secrets, and patent?
The application of CHM principles to information and transborder
data flows is not just a speculative exercise. Growing references to an
international regime for transborder data flows may have as an anachro-
nistic source of reference the "international regime" language in Article
11, paragraph 5 of the Moon Treaty. 34 This use should be carefully
monitored.2 35
G. Data Pledge and Data Passport: A Right to Travel for Things?
To date, efforts to gather support for a Data Pledge236 have not been
successful. A Data Pledge could ask states to refrain from imposing reg-
United States, must analyze their laws and regulations to make certain that information from other
nations stored within that nation is considered sovereign to the nation of origin and not subject to
orders of disclosure without first obtaining agreement of the nation of origin."
234 See supra note 224 and accompanying text. Article 11, paragraph 5, provides State "parties to
this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime, including appropriate proce-
dures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resource of the Moon...."
235 Letter from Professor Louis B. Sohn of the University of Georgia School of Law to the author
(Oct. 3, 1983) (available from Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business). Professor
Sohn offered the following observation on the Common Heritage of Mankind in commenting on a
draft of this Perspective:
As far as the common heritage principle is concerned, as we have found in the law of the sea, it
has no meaning by itself and its implications must be carefully defined de novo for each new area
where its application is demanded. Its only real effect is that the fruits of new developments
should not go only to those able directly to benefit from it, but the benefits should to some
extent be shared with others. In our interdependent world, where many countries suffer if other
countries pursue too selfishly their own interests, it has become obvious that there is a great
need to follow the basic principle of international law that the rights of one state must be exer-
cised with reasonable regard to the interests of other states. Any other approach will lead to
anarchy.
236 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Expert Group on Transborder
Data Flows, Data Declaration: Proposal by the United States Delegation, OECD Doc. ISTI/ICCP/
82.17 (Mar. 5, 1982). On September 19, 1984, the OECD Secretariat issued a "Draft Proposal On
Common Intent On Transborder Data Flows", OECD Doc. DSTI/ICCP/84.27, the most recent
version of a Data Declaration. In paragraph 14, OECD member countries express their intention,
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ulations on data flow, and might, through refining of drafts, attempt to
articulate a general statement of data free flow. For international infor-
mation transfers, a Data Passport might apply, drawing perhaps on
analagous principles from General Licenses under United States export
control laws. Under current United States export control laws, a Gen-
eral License does not require written application. It is a regulation which
grants permission to make an export without a specially issued document
authorizing it. However, a Shippers Export Declaration describing the
commodity, certifying it as exportable, giving names and addresses of
parties to the export, as well as country of ultimate destination required
under a General License would obviously be inappropriate for a Data
Passport. Further, existing United States Export Control Laws already
regulate data flow,237 exempting data in the public domain and granting
a general license for other technical data.
There is, as yet, no generally recognized right to travel for things,
and not for data if that term includes all information. However, Article
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares: "Everyone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of fron-
tiers. '238 A right to "seek, receive, and impart information and ideas" is
something everyone is declared to have. If I have a right to "seek, re-
ceive, and impart," does this concept cover any right of ideas and infor-
mation to move?
In his monumental work, American Constitutional Law,2 39 Professor
Laurence H. Tribe reviews, among many other topics, the constitutional
cases dealing with interstate and international travel and finds that "the
right. . . relates more to the importance of lifting all artificial barriers to
personal mobility than to the virtues of an integrated national econ-
omy."' ' He also notes that restrictions on the right to travel may
involve:
1. [r]ules that impermissibly seek to operate to lock people into a jurisdic-
tion by restricting emigration either by directly or by making reentry
inordinately difficult;2 41
2. [r]ules that restrict entry either by (a) discriminating against new resi-
dents with respect to various public services or benefits or (b) by impos-
among other matters to "develop comprehensive and mutually acceptable framework conditions for
international data and information transfers".
237 15 C.F.R. § 379 (1984).
238 See supra note 26 (emphasis supplied).
239 The Foundation Press, 1978.
240 Id. at 953-54.
241 Id. at 955.
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ing quantiative controls on immigration; both (a) and (b) are void
unless compellingly justified;2 42 [and]
3. [r]ules that neither lock people in nor fence them out, [which] might
impermissibly inhibit travel either (a) by making movement itself un-
justifiably difficult or hazardous; or (b) by attaching adverse conse-
quences, without reasonable justification, to the fact of nonresidence. 243
A right to travel founded on a principle of eliminating artificial barriers
to personal mobility would be difficult to extend to data mobility. Never-
theless, it is interesting to note the parallels between types of rules re-
stricting such personal mobility and similar rules restricting data flow
mobility.2 4 4
V. CONCLUSION
This Perspective has attempted to identify the technological founda-
tion of an emerging information industry, to discuss carriage, content
and trade aspects of international information transfers, to propose prin-
ciples for a model code which might facilitate information transfers, and
to examine legal concepts which might seem applicable to such transfers.
These areas and the answers to the questions raised in this Perspective's
introduction are shaping our experience with international information
transfers. In looking forward, it is appropriate to remember a perspec-
tive provided by Henry James in "The Art of Fiction:"
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 For example, data protection laws (such as those in Germany, Austria, Denmark, France,
Norway, and Sweden which use a data register system), the data protection equivalency exception in
the OECD/TBDF Guidelines or the equivalency provisions in Article 12 of the proposed Council of
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Per-
sonal Data (opened for signature Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108) could be perceived as being or
recognizing the legitimacy of rules "locking" data into a jurisdiction by restricting its flow unless
conditions for movement are met. Achieving a consensus of principles on what should or should not
be permissible, or what is or is not justifiable in restricting data flows would likely be an illusive,
difficult but necessary prerequisite to securing adherence to a Data Pledge or recognition of a Data
Passport. Even under the proposed Council of Europe Convention, application of principles may
produce less rather than more flow of data. See supra note 172, at 623 n.127:
For example, one party may have extended the Convention's application to protect data per-
taining to juristic persons. . . . If the potential recipient party has not made a similar exten-
sion, the first party may legitimately refuse the transfer of data to that country by claiming that
the recipient's protection is not equivalent. Under the current language of the Convention, this
situation could occur even where the prospective recipient has otherwise complied with the
terms of the treaty. Moreover, the first party has almost total discretion, since under Article 12,
section 3(a) it may refuse to transfer the data merely due to the nature of the data ....
Further, data protection laws which utilize a licensing procedure, mandatory security assurance, or
bar transmission of encrypted data might be seen as impermissibly or unnecessarily, restricting or
locking information into a jurisdiction or as making movement of such information unjustifiably
difficult. Such laws are exceptions to the mobility concept found in the Universal Declaration of




The power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implications
of things, to judge the whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling
life in general so completely that you are well on your way to knowing any
particular corner of it-this cluster of gifts may almost be said to constitute
experience .... Therefore, if I should certainly say to a novice "Write
from experience and experience only," I should feel that this was rather a
tantalizing monition if I were not careful immediately to add, "Try to be
one of the people on whom nothing is lost.
' 245
I predict that in the area of international information transfers, our lim-
ited experience will soon catch up with our vast expectations, and if so,
then it will be mankind on whom "nothing is lost".
245 Cavell, The Thought of Movies, 72 THE YALE REv. 181, 184 (1983).
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Appendix I
"International Information Transfer" Not
"Transborder Data Flow"
For many years I have urged that some new phrase replace "trans-
border data flow" or "TBDF". This is not merely a matter of linguistic
preference. Words should convey meaning; "transborder data flow" does
not.
Transborder data flow is frequently linked with free flow of informa-
tion. Confusion usually results. Is "data" the same thing as "informa-
tion?" As one commentator noted: "People rarely distinguish between
data, information, knowledge, and wisdom. Yet they are as different
from one another-and as interlocking-as starch molecules, flour,
bread, and the flavorful memory of a superb morning croissant."1
In the United States, "data" and "information" are concepts in our
own regulations. For example, the Export Control Regulations include
provisions on the export of technical "data." 2 The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act covers the disclosure of information with specified exceptions.'
But concepts of "data," usually associated with computers, may not fit
readily into what we usually think is covered by "speech" in the First
Amendment or the expression of ideas in the area of Copyright under
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
Interchanging "data" and "information" concepts becomes even
more confusing when we move from a domestic to an international con-
text. For example, concepts of a right to communicate, as expressed in
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights4, may not fit
I Branscomb, Information: The Ultimate Frontier, SCIENCE, Jan. 1979, at 143.
2 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 379.8 (1984).
3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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readily into concepts of international economic regulation and trade.
Terms used in other languages, for example the French term "informa-
tique" (covering data processing) or "telematique" (for the merger of
data processing and telecommunications) may more easily accommodate
meanings in "international information transfer" than in "transborder
data flow."
Other sources of confusion exist in related questions. Does "free"
mean "no charge" or the absence of governmental restraint? When a
reporter electronically transmits a story, does the information in the
story become data? Obviously, these are difficult questions whose an-
swers will require a context and whose terms will require clarity before
even tentative conclusions can be reached and understood.
In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Informa-
tion and Individual Rights of the House Committee on Government Op-
erations, Matthew Nimetz, former Under Secretary for Security
Assistance, Science and Technology, Department of State, stated "Inter-
national communication and information activities encompass a wide
field. The common thread is that information is transmitted from one
point to another. . . ."' This underlying concept of information trans-
mission is more clearly expressed in "international information transfer"
than in the phrase "transborder data flow."
Other examples show why international information transfer is a
better term than transborder data flow. In a regulatory context, another
example is provided by Henry Beck. In his article "Control Of and Ac-
cess To, On-Line Computer Data Bases: Some First Amendment Issues
in Videotex and Teletext," 6 he states ". . . the important question of
whether the 'electronic publication' of information is to be described as
'data processing' or as 'communication' remains open, although the for-
mer may not be subject to current government regulation while the latter
most certainly is." 7 He also notes:
In its initial attempt to grapple with the problem of distinguishing "com-
munications" from "data processing", the FCC left unregulated "opera-
tions which exclude the function of storing, retrieving, sorting, merging and
calculating data according to programmed instructions. . . ." The FCC
originally held that operations in which computers were used in a message-
switching capacity-to control the "transmission of messages, between two
or more points, via communications facilities wherein the content of the
5 International Data Flow: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 27, 1980) (statement of Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary
for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Dept. of State).
6 Beck, Control of, and Access to, On-line Computer Data Bases: Some First Amendment Issues
in Videotex and Teletext, 5 COMM./ENT. L.J. 1 (1983).
7 Id. at 4.
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message remains unaltered", would be subject to government regula-
tion. . . . However, this distinction has been abandoned in favor of one
dividing the domain into "basic" and "enhanced" services.
8
Similarly, it may be appropriate, outside the limited area of FCC inquiry
into computer and communications service interdependence, to abandon
"data flow" as a concept, and replace it with one which focuses more
clearly on information.
Another example of this problem-confusing meanings of "data"
and "information"-can be found in the "Brazilian Case Study"
("Transborder Data Flows and Brazil: The Role of Transnational Cor-
porations, Impacts of Transborder Data Flows and Effects of National
Policies"). The Brazilian Case Study, prepared in 1982 by the Special
Secretariat of Informatics of the National Security Council of the Presi-
dency of the Republic of Brazil, in cooperation with the Ministry of
Communications of Brazil, states (emphasis in each case added):
The resource defining information services is data. ...'
The possession and capacity to utilize information resources are in-
creasingly becoming a form of national power. Structured data- like tech-
nology-are now valuable commodities that are traded through
telecommunication networks.... In international trade, embodied tech-
nology tends to be substituted for non-embodied technology (software and
data). .... 10
Brazil has adopted and implemented a set of policies on transborder
data flows and the underlying fields of telecommunications, informatics and
telematics. . . .Brazil's policy in this area is based on the principle that a
country has the right to regulate its transborder data flows because of the
potential impact these flows have on socio-economic development. More
specifically, the objectives of this policy are to maximize the amount of in-
formation resources-such as computers, software, data bases, technical
and managerial skills-located in its territory; . . . to enable the Brazilian
society to have universal access to information . . .11
The term "telematics" is used here interchangeably with
"teleinformatics", "communications" and computer-communications".12
Telematics or transborder-data-flow networks result from the joint use
of three main types of resources: computers (and their mass-storage capaci-
ties), telecommunications networks and data (emphasis added). 3
8 Id. n.9.
9 SPECIAL SECRETORIAT OF INFORMATICIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND BRAZIL: THE ROLE
OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, IMPACTS ON TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND EFFECTS OF
NATIONAL POLICY 22, at 7 (1983).
10 Id. 41, at 13.
11 Id. 7, at 2-3.
12 Id. 8, at 6.
13 Id. 21, at 7.
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Understanding terms is, of course, an essential element of meaning-
ful communications, and to identifying legal principles which may apply.
This is particularly important where legal principles associated with in-
ternational communications14 and legal principles associated with inter-
14 See Freeman, Direct Broadcast Developments and Directions: The National Sovereignty and
Cultural Integrity Positions, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
74TH ANNUAL MEETING 306 (1980):
If incoming communication is solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction, then the right of sover-
eign control must prevail [under Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter]. The custom of nations to
regulate their communication systems suggests that any broadcast is, in fact, a domestic matter.
Yet the U.N. Charter really only raises important questions: is the right to receive information
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, or is it more a matter of inter-nation, and so truly
international affairs? Moreover, Article 55 of the Charter requires all U.N. member states to
promote and preserve human rights, of which the free flow of information may be one.
See also Rothblatt, The Impact of International Satellite Communications Law upon Access to the
Geostationary Orbit and the Electromagnetic Spectrum, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 207 (1981), for an excel-
lent discussion of communications theory, international satellite communications policy and applica-
ble legal rules. Rothblatt examines four sources of international law, recognized by the International
Court of Justice, for evidence of the current state of international satellite communications law. He
concludes these four sources of positive international law support international legal principles
which "appear to require the maximum dispersion of geostationary telecommunications channels
along dimensions of depth [the message volume per unit of time a communication pathway can
conduct], distribution [the mean distance between communicators], and directionality [the charac-
teristic of a communication channel to convey messages in one direction, e.g., to send only like a
radio broadcast service, or to convey messages in more than one direction, e.g., to send and receive
like a telephone network].
Channel directionality, the measure of balance of lateralness between message transmission and
message reception, is promoted by decentralizing the means of making and sending messages.
The general practice of nations has been to subordinate development of this dimension to the
development of channel depth and channel distribution. This custom may be attributed to
(1) political reluctance to democratize the power associated with message production and trans-
mission and (2) substantial economic and technological barriers to the mass provision of two
way communications channels. However, largely as a result of successful efforts to increase
channel depth and distribution, the economic and technological barriers to greater directivity
are beginning to crumble, and initial assaults are being launched against political impediments.
The political assaults upon centralized message production and transmission seek recognition of
a "right to communicate" and of a "New World Information Order". As a matter of interna-
tional custom, these efforts to elevate channel directionality to the positions of prominence en-
joyed by channel depth and distribution cannot yet be characterized as generally accepted
practices of nations. For the present, international custom with regard to directivity requires
only that some international telecommunications channels be capable of conveying messages in
two directions. This lack of concern with the degree of lateral structure in the international
flow of messages should be contrasted with the record of affirmative global efforts in maximizing
the message volume and geographical distribution of satellite communications.
IdM at 227-28. See also TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, MEDIA INSTITUTE, COMMU-
NICATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 1 (1983). Leonard J. Theberge, President of the Media Insti-
tute and Chairman of the International Communications Committee, Section of International Law
and Practice, American Bar Association, focuses on the interplay between technology and policy:
The conversion of information into streams of electrons which can be instantly dispersed
throughout the world blurs traditional distinctions among those who produce, process and use
the information. A U.S. State Department cable; a news broadcast; an Olympic pole vaulter;
the TV program "I Love Lucy;" a computer software program; inventory data from Sears Roe-
buck in Brazil to its Chicago, Illinois headquarters; and money transferred from Citibank, Man-
hattan to its Sao Paulo branch are all virtually indistinguishable when converted to electronic
impulses. This conversion also makes it difficult to maintain distinctions among domestic and
international communications policies and issues.
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national commerce 15 are cited as justification for regulation or are
recommended for application to new products and services.
Further, if the terms we use become associated with State activity
that is more in the realm of communication than commerce, the result
may be determinative, at least initially, of the position we take on that
action: if communication and media are involved, the State's action
should be one of exceptional restraint (under a First Amendment ration-
ale) as opposed to a more accommodating acceptance of permissible
State activity for purposes of economic regulation. Developing national
information policies may need to balance concerns with communication,
commerce and economic regulation. It may be easier to do so with
clearer terms.




The OECD TBDF Guidelines: A Basic
Summary
The OECD Guidelines Governing The Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data' are an Annex to a Recommenda-
tion of the Council of the OECD. There is also an Appendix to the Rec-
ommendation and Annex which is an Explanatory Memorandum written
by the Group of Experts that prepared the Guidelines. The Explanatory
Memorandum is an "information document," "subordinate to the
Guidelines" which "can not vary the meaning of the Guidelines." How-
ever, the Explanatory Memorandum can assist in the "interpretation and
application" of the Guidelines.
There are four parts to the Recommendation of the Council of the
OECD: (1) that Member countries "take into account in their domestic
legislation" the Guidelines' principles concerning "protection of privacy
and individual liberties;" (2) that these countries "endeavor to remove or
avoid creating, in the name of privacy protection, unjustified obstacles"
to transborder personal data flows; (3) that these countries cooperate in
implementing the Guidelines; (4) that these countries "agree as soon as
possible" on specific consultation and cooperation procedures for apply-
ing the Guidelines.
There are five parts to the Annex: (1) Part One defines the Guide-
lines scope and specifies the Guidelines are minimum standards; (2) Part
Two consists of eight "Basic Principles of National Application: Free
Flow and Legitimate Restrictions;" (3) Part Three consists of Basic Prin-
1 OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
reprinted in SECOND REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE
FACE OF TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DATA PROCESSING, 1981-82 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-
548)(1981).
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ciples of International Application: Free Flow and Legitimate Restric-
tions;" (4) Part Four concerns implementation of the basic principles;
(5) Part Five describes actions Member countries should take, e.g., ex-
change of information, insuring procedures for transborder personal data
flow are compatible with those of other Member countries complying
with the Guidelines, etc.
It should be noted that the Guidelines define a data controller as "a
party who, according to domestic law, is competent to decide about the
contents and use of personal data regardless of whether or not such data
are collected, stored, processed or disseminated by that party or by an
agent on its behalf." Again, one must look to national legislation for
answers in this area, and to determine who might be an "agent." The
Guidelines also apply to "personal data, whether in the public or private
sectors" which "because of the manner in which they are processed, or
because of their nature or the context in which they are used, pose a
danger to privacy and individual liberties." The Guidelines are not to be
"interpreted as preventing. . the exclusion" in national legislation of
personal data which "obviously do(es) not contain any risk to privacy
and individual liberties." Further, Part Three of the Guidelines, "Basic
Principles of International Application: Free Flow and Legitimate Re-
strictions," states:
A Member country should refrain from restricting transborder flows of per-
sonal data between itself and another Member country except where the
latter does not yet substantially observe these Guidelines or where the re-ex-
port of such data would circumvent its domestic privacy legislation. A Mem-
ber country may also impose restrictions in respect of certain categories of
personal data for which its domestic privacy legislation includes specific
regulations in view of the nature of those data and for which the other Mem-
ber country provides no equivalent protection (emphasis added).
Finally, another important basic principle of international application is
that "Member countries should avoid developing laws, policies and prac-
tices for protecting privacy and individual liberties" which would create
obstacles to transborder flows of personal data that would exceed re-
quirements for such protection. The Explanatory Memorandum inter-
prets this principle as not intended to limit the rights of Member
countries to regulate transborder flows of personal data in areas relating
to free trade, tariffs, employment, and related economic conditions for
international data traffic.
In addition to technological developments and international organi-
zations, there is an existing array of TBDF legislation in Europe, cover-
ing automatic and manual data processing, physical and legal persons,
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penalties for non-compliance with the legislation, and license
requirements.
The following eight principles in Part Two of the Guidelines clearly
establish broad general standards against which to measure conformity
of applicable national legislation:
1. Collection Limitation Principle-There should be limits to the collec-
tion of personal data; "where appropriate" the data should be ob-
tained with the knowledge or consent of the data subject. The
Explanatory Memorandum offers the following interpretation of
"where appropriate": "There are situations where for practical or
policy reasons the data subject's knowledge or consent cannot be
considered necessary. Criminal investigation activities and the rou-
tine up-dating of mailing lists may be mentioned as examples."
2. Data Quality Principle-Personal data should be relevant for the
purposes for which it is to be used and should be accurate, complete
and kept up to date.
3. Purpose Specification Principle-The purposes for collecting personal
data should be specified not later than when the data is collected and
the data should be used to fulfill those purposes or others not imcom-
patible with them.
4. Use Limitation Principle-Except with consent of the data subject or
by authority of law, personal data should not be disclosed, made
available or used in deviation from the Purpose specification
principle.
5. Security Safeguards Principle-Reasonable security safeguards
should protect personal data from unauthorized access, destruction,
use, modification or disclosure.
6. Openness Principle-There should exist a general policy of openness
about personal data developments, practices and policies, as well as a
means of establishing the existence, nature, and purposes for which
personal data exist.
7. Individual Participation Principle-An individual should have the
right to obtain information on whether a "data controller" has data
relating to him; should have the right to challenge a denial of a re-
quest for the foregoing; and should have the right to challenge data
relating to him, and if successful in the challenge, to have the data
erased, rectified, completed or amended. However, the Explanatory
Memorandum notes that "the right to access and challenge cannot
be absolute. .. ."
8. Accountability Principle-Accountability for complying with mea-
sure implementing the principles should be on the "data controller."
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Appendix III
Four Country Experiences of One Firm
On August 10, 1982, the Section of International Law and Practice,
and the Section of Science and Technology presented a program "Legal
and Business Implications of Restrictions On Transborder Data Flow" at
the American Bar Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco. This
appendix, prepared by Stephan 0. Beach of Control Data Corporation
and included in his remarks at that meeting, describes some problems of
Control Data Corporation outside the United States in information
processing using communications lines and networks. Though these ex-
amples are two years old, they are neveretheless useful in considering
whether the results or time required to resolve the problems presented
might have been different if GATT applied to information processing
services. Results would probably have been more difficult to obtain and
have taken longer given the resulting publicity and political considera-
tion inherent in the GATT process.
A. Mexico
Control Data has attempted to obtain authorization to install pri-
vate leased line services in Mexico for use in the marketing of remote
access data processing services. The Mexican government refuses to al-
low the marketing of remote access data processing services in Mexico by
foreign corporations and still prohibits the use of private line services for
this purpose. There is no satisfactory solution to this problem in Mexico.
A foreign corporation that wishes to market remote access data process-
ing services in Mexico is free to make arrangements with a wholly-owned
Mexican company to market and maintain the services within that coun-
try. The foreign corporation is allowed to install leased lines to deliver





In 1980 the German telecommunications administration passed
some regulations which would prohibit the installation of private lines
running from another country into Germany unless such circuits were
either "hardwired" to a single terminal device or were terminated in a
computer system in Germany where actual computing took place before
the processed data was passed into the German public telecommunica-
tions network. Control Data entered into direct negotiations with the
German telecommunications authorities explaining that Control Data
did process work for German customers on systems which were located
outside of Germany. They were told that Control Data processed work
at its Frankfurt processing center for customers who were located in
other countries and that work was processed for German multinational
companies needing access to fies located outside of Germany. Finally,
we suggested that the new regulations would force Control Data to move
processing then being done in Frankfurt to other centers outside of Ger-
many. The German authorities, after due consideration and a series of
meetings, agreed to allow Control Data to carry on its then method of
processing for a period of seven years. Their rationale was that the con-
centration equipment installed by Control Data in Germany had a re-
maining useful life of seven years. Today the German
telecommunications authorities are taking a second look at their new reg-
ulations as they are encountering a number of other problems with them.
C. Japan
In 1976, Control Data attempted to install a private leased circuit
between Tokyo, Japan and the United States for the purpose of market-
ing a variety of remote access data processing services in Japan. After a
considerable period of time and protracted negotiations, a circuit was
installed in the Fall of 1977. However, there was a condition on the
installation that the circuit had to be terminated in the United States at a
single computer mainframe located at Control Data's center in Cleve-
land, Ohio. Only services which were processed on this single system
could be marketed in Japan. This restricted Control Data to utilization
of only about 10% of its leased line capacity, and only about 10% of its
total line of marketable services. Control Data sought the help of the
Department of State, the Japanese American Trade Facilitation Commit-
tee of the Department of Commerce and the National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration of the Department of Commerce.
Little practical help to resolve this problem resulted from those contacts.
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Control Data then filed formal and informal petitions with the Office of
the Special Trade Representative under the Trade Reorganization Act.
Through its trade organization, ADAPSO, formal complaints were filed
with the Federal Communications Commission. In addition, numerous
negotiations were held between Control Data and authorities of the Min-
istry of Posts and Telecommunications of Japan and KDD, the interna-
tional common carrier, of Japan. Many meetings were held in Tokyo,
New York, Washington and at OCITT meetings in Geneva, Switzerland.
The problem was considered for solution through legislation during hear-
ings before the Committee on Government Operations of the United
States House of Representatives. Finally, in May of 1981, after years of
negotiations, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of Japan
modified its regulations to allow Control Data to use its private leased
line to process data services applications for Japanese customers on sys-
tems located at Control Data processing centers within the United States
other than that at Cleveland, Ohio including Rockville, Maryland; Sun-
nyvale, California, Arden Hills, Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, etc.
This now permits Control Data to market its full line of remote access
data processing services in Japan.
D. Spain
In 1978, Control Data attempted to arrange with the Spanish tele-
communications authorities for the installation of leased private line ser-
vice between Madrid, Spain and Brussels, Belgium. The purpose was to
market a timesharing offering of Control Data known as CALL/370.
The Spanish authorities advised that if Control Data wished to secure
leased lines for the delivery of CALL/370 timesharing services, it would
be necessary to install the circuits from Madrid directly to the location
where the processing was to be done. In this case it was to be done in
Cleveland, Ohio, and therefore they demanded that we install a circuit
directly from Madrid, Spain to Cleveland, Ohio. There demand did not
take into account that we had a switching point in Brussels, Belgium
which would enable us to go from Madrid to Brussels and then to Cleve-
land, Ohio via our Control Data network.
Control Data determined that the potential volume of CALL/370
business in Spain did not justify the installation of a direct circuit to
Cleveland and accordingly dropped plans for the marketing of the service
in Spain. Later, various Control Data multinational customers began to
take terminals into Spain and place long-distance calls to nearby French
cities which were on the Control Data network, thereby allowing them to
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access the system through Brussels. After two years of consideration, the
Spanish telecommunications authorities realized that they would obtain
more revenue through leased circuits from Madrid to Brussels and de-
cided to allow Control Data to install such circuits.
